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Abstract
Demand for insurance can be driven by high risk aversion or high risk. We
show how to separately identify risk preferences and risk types using only choices
from menus of insurance plans. Our revealed preference approach does not rely
on rational expectations, nor does it require access to claims data. We show
what can be learned non-parametrically from variation in insurance plans, o¤ered
separately to random cross-sections or o¤ered as part of the same menu to one
cross-section. We prove that our approach allows for full identication in the
textbook model with binary risks and extend our results to continuous risks. We
illustrate our approach using the Massachusetts Health Insurance Exchange, where
choices provide informative bounds on the type distributions, especially for risks,
but do not allow us to reject homogeneity in preferences.
1 Introduction
Two key sources of variation in the demand for insurance are variation in risk pref-
erences (e.g., degree of risk aversion) and variation in risk types (e.g., probability of
making a claim). The distinction between the two is crucial for positive and norma-
tive analysis (e.g., Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen 2010, Chetty and Finkelstein 2013).
Adverse selection, in which consumers select into insurance plans based on expected
expenditure, can lead to market unravelling and ine¢ ciently low coverage. In contrast
with heterogeneity in risks, preference heterogeneity cannot cause insurance markets to
be adversely selected. In fact, recent empirical work nding advantageous selection (in
We would like to thank Richard Blundell, Ian Crawford, Mark Dean, Geert Dhaene, Liran Einav,
Phil Haile, Arthur Lewbel, Bernard Salanié and Frans Spinnewyn for helpful comments and discussions.
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which low risk individuals purchase more generous insurance plans) has been consid-
ered evidence for the importance of preference heterogeneity (e.g., Cutler, Finkelstein,
and McGarry 2008).
A growing empirical insurance literature estimates heterogeneity in both preferences
and in risk types using data on plan choices and insurance claims (see Einav, Finkel-
stein and Levin 2010, Barseghyan, Molinari, ODonoghue and Teitelbaum 2015a). This
approach is data-demanding compared to standard demand estimation. More impor-
tantly, using this type of data, separate identication of preferences and risks requires
assumptions about individuals(rational) expectations over the distribution of claims.
Yet in the context of health insurance, for example, consumers may not understand
how di¤erent health states map into health expenditures due to the opacity of health
care prices (Leiber 2014). They may be overcondent about their own health states
(Grubb 2015) and underweight small probability events (Johnson et al. 1993). Given
these constraints and biases, it seems reasonable to believe that consumers may have
distorted perceptions of the risk they face. If consumers do not have rational expecta-
tions over the distribution of their future claims, claims data cannot help to separate
a low degree of risk aversion from overoptimistic beliefs about risk.
We present an alternative framework, based on revealed preference, that shows how
to identify individualsrisk perceptions and preferences from choice data alone. Our
approach does not rely on rational expectations, nor does it require claims data, but
exploits variation in the plans from which individuals can choose. This new framework
allows us to revisit the question how important preference heterogeneity is for the
observed variation in insurance choices. It also provides an alternative approach to
estimating perceived risks. Our estimates could be used, in combination with claims
data, to assess the accuracy of risk perceptions, which is relevant for welfare and policy
analysis in insurance markets (Spinnewijn 2012, Handel, Kolstad and Spinnewijn 2015).
The key challenge in inferring risk perceptions and preferences from insurance
choices is that both high risk and risk aversion increase the willingness to buy in-
surance. To overcome this challenge, we use variation in insurance plan characteristics
that di¤erentially attract individuals along the risk and preference dimension. The
identication argument in our model exploits the fact that marginal willingness to buy
insurance is more rapidly decreasing in coverage for individuals with high risk aver-
sion (but low risk) than for individuals with low risk aversion (but high risk). As a
consequence, two plans that di¤er in their coverage level and premiums can di¤eren-
tially attract individuals along the risk and preference dimension. Our approach can
provide informative bounds on preference and risk types using cross-sectional data on
individuals choosing from a single menu of plans. The approach is more powerful when
applied to choice data from similar populations facing di¤erent menus of plans. Such
variation in insurance options for otherwise identical populations might be driven by
di¤erences in the regulatory environment, by di¤erences in costs of insurance provision
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(across states or time), or by di¤erences in market power of insurance providers.1
We convey the key intuition for identication in a simple model with binary risks
and binary choices with cross-sectional variation in the choice sets. In this binary choice
setting, data on insurance choices from a single menu is insu¢ cient to reject homogene-
ity in risks or preference (even if heterogeneity was substantial). The observation of
cost realizations cannot help either to reject preference homogeneity if the market is
adversely selected. But with similar individuals facing di¤erent menus, the di¤erence
in plan shares under the menus allow us to put bounds on the distribution of both risk
types and risk preferences. In order to achieve this partial identication, individuals
must face a menu in which plans that provide more coverage charge a higher price, but
are cheaper per unit of coverage. As a result, such plans will attract high-risk, but low
risk-aversion types. In the absence of such variation, it is impossible to reject homo-
geneity in preferences, even if claims data is observed and expectations are rational.
Data on plan choices allow us to overcome another challenge when working with claims
data of inferring heterogeneity in (ex ante) risk types from (ex post) risk realizations.
Without additional structure on the heterogeneity in risk types, such inference can only
be made from plan choices.
Remaining with binary risks, we demonstrate the potential of plan variation for
identication in the standard textbook insurance model. Here, individuals decide how
much coverage to buy at a constant price per unit of coverage. This can be represented
as choices among binary sets with high vs. low coverage, but with a large number of
such choice sets this conveniently reduces to the textbook model where individuals may
choose any amount of coverage at the specied unit price. As risk aversion determines
the gradient of the marginal willingness to pay with respect to coverage, it also deter-
mines the change in preferred coverage when the unit price of coverage changes, while
both an individuals risk and risk aversion determine the agents preferred coverage
level. We show how the joint distribution of binary risks and CARA preferences can
be non-parametrically identied exploiting price variation in the textbook model. Full
identication would require innite price variation. Limited price variation already
su¢ ces to identify key moments capturing the heterogeneity in both dimensions.
We then extend the model beyond binary risks and choice sets to settings that more
closely resemble actual health insurance coverage. In practice, health insurance plans
are characterized by deductibles, co-insurance rates and out-of-pocket maxima. Indi-
viduals of di¤erent preference and risk types care di¤erentially about covering di¤erent
types of expenses. For example, the decreasing returns to coverage imply that individu-
als with high risk aversion care more about reducing high out-of-pocket expenses (e.g.,
a decrease in the out-of-pocket maximum) than the reduction of out-of-pocket expenses
1Standard revealed preference arguments are based on the same individual choosing consumption
bundles at di¤erent prices. In insurance markets we rarely have such data: insurance options for
individuals often change when the characteristics of the individual changed and individualsresponses
may not reect their preference ranking due to inertia (Handel 2013).
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that are already low (e.g., a decrease in the deductible). We also illustrate how the
same plan variation drives identication when all plans are o¤ered within one menu to
a single cross-section of individuals. The key intuition is the same as in the case with
cross-sectional variation in binary choice sets, as di¤erent plans need to di¤erentially
attract types along the di¤erent dimensions. The obtained bounds are di¤erent though.
Within-menu plan variation naturally arises in many practical settings, which is also
what we exploit in our empirical analysis.
We apply our method to choice data from the Massachusetts Health Insurance
Exchange. We nd informative bounds on the distribution of preferences and risks ex-
ploiting variation in the features of the contracts o¤ered. Interestingly, we cannot reject
homogeneity in preferences as the di¤erent plan choices can be rationalized with only
heterogeneity in risks. However, we do reject homogeneity in risks. The required vari-
ance in risks increases as we restrict the analysis to reasonable preference parameters.
We then compare our bounds to estimates from the existing literature. Our application
shows what can be learned from choice data alone and highlights the strengths of the
revealed preference approach.
Our paper is motivated by a recent, but prominent literature analyzing heterogene-
ity in preferences and risks empirically, reviewed in Einav, Finkelstein and Levin (2010)
and Barseghyan et al. (2015a). This literature started with empirical tests for asym-
metric information in insurance markets, often nding a weak relationship between risk
type and insurance choice (see Chiappori and Salanié, 2014 and Cohen and Siegelman,
2010). This inspired a new series of papers estimating the heterogeneity in risk pref-
erences jointly with the heterogeneity in risk types in di¤erent markets. Examples are
auto insurance (Cohen and Einav 2007), annuities (Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf
2010) and health insurance (Bundorf, Levin and Mahoney 2012). These studies use
choice and claims data to estimate a structural model of heterogeneity and nd sig-
nicant preference heterogeneity. Our work starts from a similar model of consumer
choice in which individuals choose insurance plans that maximize their expected utility
given their specic risk and preference parameters. Our approach, however, does not
require the additional structure on heterogeneity and relaxes the assumption of rational
expectations.
A separate empirical literature documents deviations from the standard model of
insurance demand. For example, Abaluck and Gruber (2011) nd that individuals buy-
ing Medicare Part D are over-responsive to prices relative to expected coverage and are
not responsive to the variance in out-of-pocket expenses. Sydnor (2010) demonstrates
that small distorted probabilities could explain deductible choices in auto and house
insurance, while with rational expectations extreme risk aversion would be needed.
The identication challenges in the absence of rational expectations have also been
addressed using survey data about beliefs (Manski 2004). Handel and Kolstad (2015)
complement insurance data with surveys and demonstrate the importance of informa-
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tion frictions more generally in explaining the choice of health insurance plans. Most
similar in spirit to our paper is Barseghyan et al. (2013), who use insurance choices
to separate probability distortions and risk preferences. They extend their benchmark
analysis to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity, but rely on parametric assumptions
about the joint distribution. In a contemporaneous review of the literature, Barseghyan
et al. (2015a) highlight the use of decreasing returns to coverage to separate risk per-
ception and preference and state how "to date, point identication of multidimensional
heterogeneity in risk preferences has relied upon parametric assumptions about their
joint distribution. It remains a question for future research, to nd a eld setting and
the proper set of assumptions to obtain nonparametric identication."
Following the Revealed Preference (RP) paradigm, our work uses only choices and
relies on price/plan variation for identication. We aim to recover preferences, but also
risk perceptions. Our methodology is di¤erent from standard empirical RP techniques
(see Crawford and De Rock, 2014) and our focus is to uncover heterogeneity in types and
does not require multiple observations of the same individuals.2 ;3 Closely related to our
work, Chiappori et al. (2009) analyze the non-parametric identication of preferences
under risk from discrete choices, using variation in menus, but again relying on data
on risk realizations.4 Choi et al. (2007) nd important preference heterogeneity for
choices under risk using experimental variation of prices, but relying on risks with
known probabilities. Barseghyan et al. (2015b) use insurance choices of the same
individual across di¤erent domains to partially identify both risk preferences and risk
distortions. Our paper illustrates how both plan variation across menus (o¤ered to
multiple cross-sections) and within a menu (o¤ered to one cross-section) can be used
for identication. We provide conditions for both partial and full identication.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up our choice model and denes
our object of interest for identication. Section 3 analyzes the identication of type
heterogeneity in a stylized model with binary risk and binary choices. We briey extend
these insights beyond our stylized model in Section 4 and apply them using insurance
choices on the Massachusetts Health Exchange in Section 5. We discuss key steps of
our proofs in the main text, and provide the formal proofs in the Appendix.
2 Setup
We consider a model in which agents decide which plan to buy to provide insurance
against a particular risk. Agents di¤er in two dimensions: the risks they face and the
2Exceptions in the RP literature are Crawford and Pendakur (2013), who study the minimum
number of types necessary to explain observed choices in cross-sectional data, and Dean and Martin
(2015), who study the largest subset of the data which is consistent with homogeneous preferences.
3Recent examples in the RP literature that allow for deviations from rational demand are Crawford
(2010), Adams et al. (2014) and Caplin and Dean (2015).
4Relatedly, Chiappori et al. (2012) and Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2014) use aggregate data on
horse races to either estimate heterogeneity in preferences or heterogeneity in beliefs.
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preferences they have. The goal is to identify the population heterogeneity in both
dimensions. The identication challenge is that di¤erences in plan choices may be
driven by di¤erences in risks, preferences or both. This section describes the most
general model, while subsequent sections concentrate on prominent special cases.
Risk and Preference. Each agent faces an uncertain cost k 2 R to which he
assigns cumulative distribution F (kj). The agents perceived risk type is denoted by
, which ranks agents by their riskiness as dened by rst-order stochastic dominance.
This implies that for two types 1 > 2, F (kj1)  F (kj2) for all k. Let  denote
the domain of possible risk types.
An insurance plan X has a premium P and maps each cost k into an out-of-pocket
expense x (k)  k. The agents preferences are represented by expected utility with
di¤erentiable Bernoulli-utility function u ( xj) for an out-of-pocket expense x. The
agents preference type is denoted by , which ranks individuals by their preference
for risk following Pratt (1964). This is naturally the case for CARA preferences with
u ( xj) =   exp (x) =. That is, for any two individuals, if 1 > 2, individual 1 is
more risk-averse than individual 2. We re-scale the preference type  such that for a
risk-neutral agent  = 0 and types with  ! 1 are innitely risk averse, so that the
domain of possible preference types  coincides with R+.5 The expected utility of a
plan X for an agent of risk-preference-type (; ) is
U (Xj; ) 
Z
u ( P   x (k) j) dF (kj) . (1)
Choice from Menu We want to infer types from observed choices by di¤erent
individuals. Let Ci denote the choice of individual i. The choice is meaningful only
relative to the menu of options that the individual can choose from. If individuals are
o¤ered the choice between insurance plans X1; X2; :::; XN , we denote this by the choice
menu M = fX1; X2; :::; XNg: If di¤erent individuals are o¤ered di¤erent menus, let
Mi = fXi1; Xi2; :::; XiNg denote the menu o¤ered to individual i:We assume either that
di¤erent individuals face the same menu as in most of the existing insurance literature,
or we assume that di¤erent plans are o¤ered randomly to individuals so that the pool
of individuals that face each menu has the same underlying distribution of preferences
and risks. We drop the agent indicator i when the context is obvious.
Each agent is o¤ered a menuMi before her cost is realized. The agents choice Ci
identies the plan within the menu that gives her the highest expected utility:
Ci 2 arg max
X2Mi
U (Xj; ) . (2)
5Convergence to innite risk aversion means that for any two gambles where the lowest possible
outcome in the rst gamble is higher than the lowest possible outcome in the second, individuals with
high enough risk preference strictly prefer the former.
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We know that a particular choice C from a particular menu M must be made by a
consumer with risk-preference-type that makes this choice optimal. Let B (CjM) be
the set of such consumer types for which we can rationalize this plan choice, that is
B (CjM) =

(; ) jC 2 arg max
X2M
U (Xj; )

.
Data and Identication Let H(; ) denote the (cumulative) distribution of
preference and risk types in the population, i.e., the fraction of people with a risk type
below  and a preference type below : This is the object we seek to identify. An
observation in our data set is a tuple zi = (Ci;Mi) where Mi denotes the menu of
plans from which individual i could choose and Ci denotes his or her actual choice. We
use the notation D () to refer to empirically observed fractions. D(C;M) is the frac-
tion of individuals observed in the population facing menu M and choosing contract
C. D(CjM) denotes the conditional distribution of choices given a particular menu.
In environments where we see multiple menus, Mi 6= Mj , we assume that these are
randomly distributed in the population. As discussed in the introduction, this arises
naturally in eld experimental settings where otherwise identical people are presented
with di¤erent menus, but might also arise in other settings where regulations and there-
fore insurance plans might di¤er for otherwise identical populations.6 We sometimes
suppress the menu when there is no ambiguity. When we discuss utilizing data on cost
realizations, we write zi = (ki; Ci;Mi), with slight abuse of notation, where ki denotes
the cost that actually materialized for this individual. Throughout, we assume that we
observe a continuum of individuals, so that the law of large number convention holds.
We outline the implication of these assumptions next.
We rst consider a single cross-section of observed insurance choices in which all
individuals face the same menuM. This follows most of the literature, but we focus on
the case where only choices are observed. Following the law of large number convention,
we say that the observed distribution D can be generated under type distribution H
if the number of observed choices does not exceed the number of types that nd it
optimal to make such choices. Formally, we require for any subsetM0 M thatZ
C2M0
D(CjM)dC 
Z
(;)2U
dH (; ) , (3)
where U =[C2M0B(CjM). Simply, the fraction of agents who choose an insurance plan
6We do not rely on multiple choice observations per individual as this seems especially unreliable
in insurance settings (see also Footnote 1). Usual revealed preference approaches discussed in the
introduction consider consumption situations where individuals choose more than once at di¤erent
relative prices, and have not changed from one choice to the next. This is problematic in insurance
settings for two reasons: rst, people might update about their risk type depending on whether they
had a high cost realization or not (while in most standard consumption settings there is no uncertainty)
and second, there is evidence that individuals display inertia. Therefore, we only rely on variation in
choices across individuals.
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within subsetM0 (left-hand side) cannot be larger than the fraction of agents in the set
of types that nd it optimal to choose an insurance plan inM0 (right-hand side).7 We
say thatD is permissable if it can be generated under some type distribution. Note that
no data on cost realizations is used here, so our identication results from insurance
choices identify perceived risk type, even if it di¤ers from their true risk. When we
discuss utilizing data on cost realizations, we use the assumption that perceived risks
coincide with the true risks, and say that distribution D is permissable if both the
choices and the empirical frequency of costs can be generated by some distribution H,
assuming that the risk type i for each individual i is the true risk that generates the
risk realization ki:8
We also consider the possibility that otherwise identical populations are asked to
choose from di¤erent menus. In this case, we observe zi = fCi;Mig for multiple
contractsMj that are randomly assigned to individuals. That is, we observe a set of
multiple cross-sections of choices fD(CjMj)g, one for each di¤erent menuMj :We say
that these observations can be generated under H if D(CjMj) can be generated under
H for each menuMj : In other words, a single type distribution rationalizes the choices
across the multiple cross-sections. The overall set of observations is permissable if it
can be generated by some type distribution.
As mentioned earlier, our object of interest is the population heterogeneity captured
by the distribution H. We evaluate whether full or partial identication is possible
depending on the type of data available. The ideal data allows us to point identify the
entire joint distribution H. We introduce the following denition, where the meaning
of a set of observations depends on which of the above settings we are in.
Denition 1 (Full Identication) We say that there is full identication if for each
permissable observed distribution D there is a unique type distribution H that can
generate it.
While identifying the full distribution and correlations between di¤erent dimensions
of heterogeneity is clearly important, it is also challenging. A key result already would
be to establish along which dimensions type heterogeneity actually matters . We are
thus interested in the marginal CDFs of risk types and preference types, denoted by H
7 If all agents have a unique optimal choice (i.e., arg maxX2M U (Xj; ) is a singleton for any (; )
combination) it can be shown that condition (3) has to hold with equality everywhere by combining
it with the fact that both D and H integrate to one. In general, agents can have multiple optimal
elements in their menu, so the number of agents who nd a particular combination optimal can be
larger than their actual choices.
8Formally, we say that the conditional distribution of costs and choices D(k; CjM) can be gener-
ated under H if there exists a probability distribution r(CjM; ; ) over the set of optimal choices
arg maxC2M U(Cj; ) such that D(k; CjM) =
R
f(kj)r(Cj; ;M)dH; where f(kj) is the proba-
bility of outcome k for risk type : Note that this implies that the marginal distribution of D over C
satises (3) in this case, so it is permissable also when we simply disregard the risk realizations ki. We
make this assumption here to be able to relate our results to the earlier insurance literature. Most of
our work will not use risk realizations, and can therefore back out beliefs i even if they were biased
relative to the true risk.
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andH. We explore whether we can impose any bounds on these marginal distributions
and, in particular, whether we can exclude that the variation in contracts can be
rationalized for some homogeneous risk-type  or preference-type , with all variation
arising because of heterogeneity in the other dimension. We introduce the following
two denitions:
Denition 2 (Identication of Bounds on Type Heterogeneity) We say that we
can identify bounds on preference (respectively, risk) heterogeneity for a permissable
distribution of observations D if we can nd  > 0 such that any distribution H that
generates D satises H ()   or 1   H ()   for some  2 R+ (respectively,
H ()   or 1 H ()   for some  2 ).
This denition ensures that we can place either lower or upper bounds on the CDF
of preference types (resp. risk types). The lower bound H ()   implies that at least
a share  of agents have a preference type weakly smaller than . The upper bound
H ()  1  implies that at least a share  of agents have a preference type strictly
larger than . The identication of bounds on the CDF in the preference dimension
alone is not su¢ cient to reject homogeneity in that dimension. For that, we would
require both an (informative) lower and upper bound on the CDF for some preference
. These bounds prevent us from tting the CDF of a degenerate distribution with all
mass concentrated in one specic type. The same holds of course for risks.
Denition 3 (Inability to Reject Homogeneity) We say that one cannot reject
preference (respectively, risk) homogeneity if for every permissable distribution of ob-
servations D there exists a type distribution H that can generate it and the support of
its marginal distribution H (respectively, H) is a singleton.
This denition refers to settings where no distribution of available data could pos-
sibly reject homogeneity in preferences (respectively risk).
3 Identication in a Stylized Model
We consider a stylized model in which individuals face binary risks and a binary choice.
This stylized model helps us to demonstrate the potential for non-parametric identi-
cation of type heterogeneity using only choice data, but exploiting plan variation. We
briey contrast this with the identication challenges using the standard claims-based
approach. In the next section, we then extend the model beyond binary risks and choice
sets to settings that more closely resemble actual health insurance coverage choices to
show the practical implementability of our choice-based approach. In particular, we will
demonstrate how the same plan variation drives identication when plans are o¤ered
jointly as part of the same menu.
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Binary Risk and Choice Set Any individual (ex ante) faces a binary cost dis-
tribution k 2 f0; Lg, either losing L or nothing at all. For instance, the individual could
become sick and require costly treatment, but faces no medical costs when healthy. The
risk type i of agent i is simply his probability of incurring the cost L:
Any individual chooses from a binary menu M = fX1; X2g that o¤ers the choice
between two insurance options X1 and X2. We focus on the simplest case where
individuals can either choose no insurance (X1 = ;) or some insurance (X2 = X): the
choice set is simplyM = f;; Xg for all individuals.
Since the risk is binary, a plan is fully determined by the premium P and the
coverage q paid in case of loss, where we restrict attention to P < q (as no plan with
P  q will ever be chosen). The expected utility of a plan X = (P; q) simplies to
U (Xj; ) = (1  )u ( P j) + u ( P   [L  q] j) ,
while remaining uninsured gives utility
U (;j; ) = (1  )u (0j) + u ( Lj) .
An individual prefers plan X over remaining uninsured if and only if

1  
u ( P   [L  q] j)  u ( Lj)
u (0j)  u ( P j)  1. (4)
The insurance plan entails a utility gain due to the coverage provided when the bad
state realizes (with probability ), but entails a utility loss due to the premium paid,
even when the good state realizes. The ratio of the utility gain relative to the utility
loss is increasing in the individuals risk aversion (Pratt 1964). As a consequence, an
individuals willingness to buy the plan is not only increasing in the risk type , but
also in her preference type .
For this binary choice environment, the main tool for analysis is the type frontier
T (;; X) which groups together all types that are indi¤erent between buying the plan
X and remaining uninsured, i.e.,
T (;; X) = f(; ) jU (Xj; ) = U (;j; )g
= B (;jM) \ B (XjM) .
Represented in (; )-space, the type frontier is monotonically decreasing as shown in
Figure 1. A risk-neutral individual ( = 0) is only willing to buy the plan if her loss
probability exceeds the price per unit of coverage, i.e.,   P=q. If the loss probability
converges to 0, an individual must become innitely risk-averse to be willing to buy
the insurance plan. We can then state the following result.
Proposition 1 Consider a binary costs k 2 f0; Lg and a binary choice setM = f;; Xg.
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With a single cross-section of choices and associated observations zi = fCi;Mg, we
cannot put any bounds on the preference heterogeneity. We can neither reject preference
homogeneity nor risk homogeneity.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. The share of individuals buying insurance,  =
D (XjM), corresponds to the mass of types that lie above the type frontier in the left
panel of Figure 1. We cannot exclude that the variation in the choice to buy the plan
is driven by heterogeneity in risk types only or by heterogeneity in preference types
only. Fix the fraction  of individuals who buy the plan.9 If agents have preference
type  but di¤er in risks so that exactly 1    of them have a type below , exactly
1    would not buy insurance which would clearly rationalize the observed choices.
This case is illustrated by the dashed density above the horizontal gray line, and the
shaded area indicates the mass of individuals with risk type below  that would not
buy insurance. Alternatively we could have assumed that all agents have the same risk
type  but are heterogeneous in preferences such that exactly 1  of them have types
below : Again, such a type distribution would rationalize the observed choices, which
is indicated by the dashed-dotted density above the vertical gray line, where again the
gray area indicates those types that would not buy insurance. Therefore, we can rule
out neither preference nor risk heterogeneity.
Only very weak results can be obtained in this setting. Since individuals are risk-
averse, only types with   P=q would be willing to buy insurance. The share of
uninsured individuals 1   places a lower bound on the share of individuals with loss
probability lower than P=q, i.e., H (P=q)  1  .
While the construction suggests that one could discipline this exercise more by
observing the costs that individuals end up incurring, we show next that it remains
impossible to disentangle the two sources of heterogeneity. We then analyze how iden-
tication becomes possible with variation in the o¤ered plans.
3.1 Standard Approach using Claims Data
We consider the case in which we observe the (ex post) realization k 2 f0; Lg of the
risk the individual decided to insure or not. In order to use this additional data in a
meaningful way we need the assumption that individuals perceive their risk accurately.
We again consider only one cross-section of individuals facing the same menu.
Inferring (ex ante) risk types from (ex post) realizations is challenging. When
individuals face a binary risk and the loss value L is the same for all individuals,
the population distribution of cost realizations is binary as well and identied by the
average loss probability. Let a 2 (0; 1) denote the average probability of a loss in the
9 In the right panel of Figure 1 type (; ) is chosen as an arbitrary point on the type frontier,
implying that this type is indi¤erent between buying the contract or not.
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Figure 1: The left panel shows the type frontier for a binary menu C = f;; Xg in (; )-
space. Types above the frontier buy the plan, while types below the fontier remain
uninsured. The right panel illustrates an indi¤erent type (; ). If all other individuals
have the same risk type  but a density of preferences as indicated by the dashed line,
choices can be rationalized. Alternatively, all individuals could have same preference
type , but di¤er in risks as in the dashed-dotted density, and again choices can be
rationalized.
population. Without further information on peoples insurance choices, the average loss
probability is not helpful in identifying risk heterogeneity. In particular, individuals
could all have the same risk type (i.e., i = a for all i), all be certain to face the loss
or not (i.e., i = 1 for share a of individuals and i = 0 for the remaining share 1 a
of individuals), or anything between as long as the average loss probability equals a.
Thus, observing costs alone does not establish any bounds on the distribution of risks.
If both cost realizations and plan choices are observed, it is possible to bound
the distribution of risks. Let ; = D(Lj;) denote the average probability of a loss
amongst individuals who do not buy insurance and let X = D(LjX) denote the
average probability among individuals who buy a contract. If these probabilities are
not the same, the population who buys insurance faces a di¤erent risk on average than
those who do not. While we can reject homogeneity in risks, we cannot bound the
risk distribution much more, as we cannot identify the risk heterogeneity among those
making the same choice, who again could all have the same risks (i.e.,  = ; for those
who dont buy insurance) or might be more heterogeneous with same average.
As long as there is adverse selection (X  ;), we will not be able to rule out
preference homogeneity. The reason is simple. Let  be the share of individuals buying
the plan, and let X and ; be the preference types such that a person with either
type (X ; X) and type (;; ;) is indi¤erent to buying insurance. Any individual with
preference type ^ 2 (X ; ;) would buy insurance when having risk type i = X ,
but not with risk type i = ;. Hence, we can rationalize the observed choices and
costs for any of these preference types simply assigning the risk type X to share 
of individuals and risk type ; to the remaining share. This is summarized in the
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following proposition:
Proposition 2 Consider a binary cost k 2 f0; Lg and a binary choice setM = f;; Xg.
With a single cross-section of choices and cost realizations zi = fki; Ci;Mg, we cannot
reject preference homogeneity under adverse selection (i.e., D (LjX)  D (Lj;)).
We note that this problem of identifying (ex ante) risk types from (ex post) risk
realizations, even under rational expectations, is a general one that extends beyond
binary risks for any family of distribution functions that is convex in the sense that
a convex combination of any two distributions is still in the family. The standard
approach in the literature, however, is to rely on parametric assumptions about the
type distributions (see Barseghyan et al. 2015a) and thus uses risk realizations to
identify the distribution of risk types as the above property is violated under specic
functional forms.10
3.2 Alternative Approach using Plan Variation: Marginal Variation
The standard approach renders it di¢ cult to bound the distribution of preferences
and to reject preference homogeneity. Therefore, we explore whether identication
is possible using variation in the o¤ered plans. The key question in this context is
which types would be willing to pay for more insurance. We explore in this subsection
the di¤erential willingness to pay for a little extra coverage, and return in the next
subsection to the actual choice between alternative options.
We rst characterize the types of individuals attracted by more generous coverage.
This can best be analyzed by considering the marginal willingness to pay for coverage
or the rate at which an individual is willing to give up consumption in the "good"
state for more consumption in the "bad" state. An insurance plan X = (P; q) implies
consumption levels in the respective states of mg (X) =  P and mb (X) =  P  
(L  q) :The marginal willingness to pay (MWtP) for an extra unit of coverage equals
MWtP =
dP
dq
jU =

 dmg
dmb
jU

1  dmg
dmb
jU
 1
; (5)
which is a strictly increasing function of the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) across
states:
  dmg
dmb
jU(Xj;) =

1   
u0 (mb (X) j)
u0 (mg (X) j) (6)
= 
1   

1  u
00 (mg (X) j)
u0 (mg (X) j) [mg (X) mb (X)]

;
10For example, the convex combination of two normal distributions tends to have two peaks and is
no longer normal. In this case the shape of the overall distribution of risks can identify the distribution
of underlying types, but this relies very much on the choice of the underlying family of distributions.
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Figure 2: The solid curve depicts the marginal willingness-to-pay for coverage (MWtP)
for a type (; ) on the type frontier and the shaded area depicts this types total
willingness to pay. The dashed line shows the MWtP for a type (0; ) with higher risk
aversion (0 > ). This type has higher total willingness to pay, so is no longer on the
type frontier. To be on the type frontier the risk has to be lower so that the MWtP is
lowered, as indicated by the dotted line for type (0; 0) with 0 < :
where the second line uses a Taylor approximation for u0 (mb (X) j), relying on the
third and higher order derivatives of the utility function being negligible. Since the
MWtP is fully determined by the MRS, we will often refer to expression (6) even when
we are talking about the underlying MWtP.
Expression (6) indicates that both a higher loss probability  and higher risk aver-
sion  u00=u0 increase the marginal willingness to pay for coverage. However, the relative
weight of risk aversion in determining the marginal willingness to pay is smaller the
more coverage the plan already provides (i.e., the smaller the consumption wedge,
mg (X)   mb (X)). The marginal value of coverage thus decreases more rapidly for
individuals with higher risk aversion. In the extreme case that a plan provides full in-
surance, the willingness to pay for the last unit of coverage equals the loss probability.
The role played by the individuals risk aversion has become of second order.
It is particularly useful to compare the willingness to pay for additional coverage
amongst those types who are just indi¤erent about buying some plan X (i.e., for types
(; ) on the type frontier T (;; X)). If we o¤ered a plan that is more generous, but
slightly more expensive, this would attract high risk individuals who are willing to pay
more on the margin. By denition, the total willingness to pay for the original plan X
with coverage q is the same for all individuals on the type frontier. Moreover, it is the
sum of the marginal willingness to pay for increasing coverage from zero to q: Consider
an individual with type (; ) on the type frontier. His marginal willingness to pay is
indicated by the solid line in Figure 2, and his total willingness to pay is indicated by
the shaded area. Any other individual on the type frontier must have the same shaded
area.
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Now consider a more risk averse preference type 0 > . If his risk is unchanged, his
marginal willingness is always higher, except at plans that o¤er full insurance. This is
depicted as the rotation to the more tilted dashed curve in Figure 2. Since for this type
the area under the curve is larger, he would strictly prefer to buy the plan rather than
remaining uninsured. For an individual with preference type 0 to be indi¤erent, his
risk must be lower. This shift to a lower risk 0 <  reduces the marginal willingness
to pay proportionally for any coverage level, indicated by the downward shift to the
dotted curve in Figure 2. An initial rotation followed by a downward shift has the
property that at coverage level q, the dotted curve is below the initial curve. The
marginal willingness to pay for any additional coverage beyond what is provided in
contract X is lower for the individual with lower risk (and higher risk aversion). This
will induce the following property amongst individuals that are indi¤erent between no
insurance and contract X, which we will exploit later on: if contract X is replaced by
a more generous but more expensive contract X 0, there will be a cuto¤ and those with
higher risks will strictly prefer to buy the new plan while the others strictly prefer not
to (compared to either the old plan or no plan, amongst which they are indi¤erent).
The previous argument relied on an initial "rotation" of the marginal willingness-
to-pay, as risk preferences matter less closer to full insurance. It was followed by a
"shift" since risk types matter everywhere, even at full insurance. We focus here on
utility functions where the above logic does hold not just close to full insurance, but
for any coverage level:
Assumption 1 We consider families of utility functions with the following property:
Along the type frontier T (;; X) the marginal rate of substitution 1  u
0(mb(X)j)
u0(mg(X)j) is
increasing in ; and it converges to zero as  goes to zero.
Since CARA preferences are typically adopted in the empirical insurance literature,
we explicitly check this property for this class of preferences:
Lemma 1 Assumption 1 holds for CARA preferences.
Proof. See appendix.
Under Assumption 1, we can study exactly which types of plan variation lead to
crossings of type frontiers which are required to identify bounds on the marginal distri-
butions as we will show shortly. For preferences not satisfying Assumption 1, we would
need to study possibly di¤erent variation to obtain crossings and thus identication.
3.3 Between-Menu Variation in Plans
We now introduce discrete variation in the plans o¤ered. We consider two plans Xh and
Xl, where plan Xh provides more coverage than plan Xl (i.e., qh > ql). We continue
to analyze binary menus Mj = f;; Xjg, with di¤erent plans o¤ered separately to
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Figure 3: The solid and dotted line show the type frontiers in (; )-space for the binary
menu C = f;; Xhg and C = f;; Xlg respectively. The type frontiers do not intersect as
the high-coverage plan charges the same (or a lower) premium and attracts all types
that would also buy the low-coverage plan.
di¤erent cross-sections of individuals. The next section shows that the same logic
drives identication when the di¤erent plans are o¤ered jointly to a single cross-section
of individuals.
Consider two randomly selected cross-sections of individuals, where the rst cross-
section is o¤ered the menu Mh = f;; Xhg and the second cross-section is o¤ered the
menu Ml = f;; Xlg. The share of individuals buying insurance when each plan is
o¤ered separately equals h = D (XhjMh) and l = D (XljMl) respectively.
If the high-coverage plan charges the same (or a lower) premium, it dominates
the low-coverage plan. All types who would buy insurance when o¤ered the low-
coverage plan also buy insurance when o¤ered the high-coverage plan (i.e., B (XljMl) 
B (XhjMh)). The high-coverage type frontier T (;; Xh) is illustrated by the solid line
in Figure 3. The type frontier lies below the low-coverage type frontier T (;; Xl)
which is illustrated by the dotted line. We can assign the observed increase in shares
h   l to the types in between the two frontiers T (;; Xl) and T (;; Xh) (i.e., to
B (XhjMh) nB (XljMl)). However, this type of plan variation sheds limited light on
the heterogeneity in either dimension separately. The observed variation in plan choices
could either be explained by risk variation or by preference variation only. The former
is illustrated by the horizontal line in Figure 3, on which all types share the same pref-
erence . In fact, the observed plan shares still do not allow to put any bounds on the
preference distribution.
If the high-coverage plan Xh is o¤ered at a higher premium, it becomes less attrac-
tive than the low-coverage plan to some individuals, but remains more attractive to
others if the premium increase is relatively small (i.e., B  Xj0 jMj0 * B (Xj jMj) for
j0 6= j). Assumption 1 implies that among those types that are indi¤erent at X; those
with high risks prefer to buy more coverage. This implies that that the type frontiers
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Figure 4: The solid and dotted lines show the type frontiers in (; )-space for the
binary menu C = f;; Xlg and C = f;; Xhg respectively. The type frontiers intersect at
(; ). The cheaper low-coverage plan charges a higher price per unit of coverage and
di¤erentially attracts types with high risk aversion and low risk.
cross only once, as depicted in Figure 4. The high-coverage type frontier T (;; Xh),
depicted by the dotted curve, is a clockwise "rotation" around (; ) relative to the
low-coverage type frontier T (;; Xl), depicted by the solid curve. Low risk types be-
tween the two curves (with  <  and  > ) buy the cheaper low-coverage plan but
would remain uninsured when o¤ered the more expensive plan, while high risk types
between the two curves (with  >  and  < ) remain uninsured when o¤ered the
cheaper low-coverage plan, but buy insurance when the plan provides the additional
coverage so long as the premium increase is not too high. Note that the risk-neutral
individual on the type frontier of plan Xj has risk type  = Pj=qj . Only if its price per
unit of coverage remains lower than for the low-coverage contract (Ph=qh < Pl=ql), the
high-coverage contract can di¤erentially attract some types to buy insurance.
Clearly, we could now set identify an individuals type if we were to observe the
individuals choice under the two menus. For example, an individual who switches out
of the insurance plan when o¤ered Xh rather than Xl, must have a risk type higher
than  and a preference type lower than . Even if we observe only one choice per
individual, but two random cross-sections of individuals choosing from the respective
menus, we can put bounds on the mass of the distribution H relative to the intersection
point as stated in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, the type frontiers for the pairwise menus f;; Xhg
and f;; Xlg with qh > ql, have a unique intersection (; ) if and only if Ph > Pl, but
Pl=ql  Ph=qh. Moreover,Z

Z

dH  h   l   
Z

Z

dH. (7)
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Proof. See appendix.
Very low risk types along the type frontier for contract Xl have near zero marginal
willingness to pay for insurance, so they will not buy the additional insurance o¤ered
by Xh: This ensures that the dotted curve in Figure 4 lies to the right of the solid curve
at low risks. Moreover, by Assumption 1, the willingness to pay changes monotonically
along the type frontier, so there can only be a unique type where the type frontiers
cross: at that point all lower risks on the type frontier for contract Xl would buy the
additional insurance while all higher risks would not. If Pl=ql > Ph=qh; for risk-neutral
preference ( = 0) the dotted curve has to be to the left of the solid one, and so there
will be a crossing, as shown in Figure 4. On the other hand, if the expensive insurance
plan o¤ers less coverage per dollar (i.e., Ph=qh > Pl=ql), the dotted curve would lie
completely to the right of the solid curve.11 In this case the type frontiers no longer
intersect as the low-coverage contract dominates the high-coverage contract, and plan
variation does not allow us to put bounds on preferences by a similar logic as that
depicted in Figure 3.12
The Lemma clearly describes the plan variation required for the type frontiers to
intersect: the high-coverage plan needs to be more expensive, but provide coverage at a
lower price per unit. If more people buy the high-coverage plan, the di¤erence in plan
shares h l places a lower bound on the share of individuals with  >  and  < .
The additional coverage is relatively more attractive to individuals with higher risk
than to individuals with higher risk aversion. If more people by the low-coverage plan,
the di¤erence l   h imposes a lower bound on the share of individuals with  < 
and  > . The exact shape of the type frontiers could help putting tighter bounds on
the joint distribution, but the more important observation is that the intersection of
the frontiers allows to place bounds on the marginal distributions as well. For example,
if the high-coverage plan is more popular, the share di¤erential places a lower bound
on the share of individuals with lower risk aversion, i.e., H () > h   l. This is in
contrast to the case discussed before where plan variation induced a shift in the type
frontier (Figure 3) rather than a rotation (as in Figure 4). Intersections of the type
frontiers are crucial for identication and more intersections help us to further tighten
the bounds on the marginal distributions.
Proposition 3 Consider a binary costs k 2 f0; Lg and observations zi =  Ci;Mi
with Mi 2 fM1; ::;MJg. With at least two appropriately chosen menus M1 and M2
o¤ered to random cross-sections of individuals, there are permissable distributions for
which we can identify bounds on preference and risk heterogeneity. With at least three
appropriately chosen menus M1;M2 and M3, there are permissable distributions for
which we can reject preference and risk homogeneity.
11This is true since it lies to the right for both low and for high risks  (and can only cross once).
12Only that here the labels between Xh and Xl are reversed.
18
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition follows relatively straightforwardly from Lemma 2. Consider two
menus f;; Xlg and f;; Xhg which generate type frontiers as depicted in Figure 4, with
crossing point (; ): Assume an underlying distribution of types such that more agents
choose the low-coverage contract than the high-coverage contract. That means that
there are more types in the shaded area above  (and below ) than in the shaded area
below. This puts a lower bound on the number of agents with preference types above 
(and below ); but does not yet rule out that all agents have the same preference or risk
type: Consider Figure 4 with another contract X 0h providing even higher coverage than
Xh and the corresponding type frontier crossing the type frontier of the high-coverage
contract to the south-east of the previous intersection (0 > ; 0 < ). If more agents
buy insurance when o¤ered this new generous contract than when o¤ered the original
high-coverage contract, we know that there exists a set of types in the underlying
distribution that have preference types below 0 (and above 0): This places bounds on
heterogeneity, since we can be sure that there are agents both with preferences above
 and below 0: The same holds for risks.
Proposition 3 suggests that more variation in insurance plans will further tighten
bounds as the observation of each additional plan may provide an additional crossing
relative to other plans. While it may not seem straightforward how this could lead to
full identication, the textbook insurance model provides a simple setting that allows
us to do exactly that.
3.4 Full Identication in the Textbook Model
The previous subsection demonstrated how plan variation can place non-parametric
bounds on the distribution of preferences and risks. This subsection turns to the
question whether variation in binary menus M = fX1; X2g across otherwise identical
populations is enough to fully identify the joint distribution H in principle. This
question relates directly to the identication of risks and preferences in the standard
textbook model of insurance choice, which has guided the thinking about insurance
markets for decades.
In our binary setting, recall that a plan Xn is fully characterized by the premium
Pn and the amount of insurance qn: Dening the unit price of insurance as pn = Pn=qn;
one can equivalently characterize the plan by (pn; qn): The question is whether enough
variation in these two components identies the underlying heterogeneity. This analysis
can be split into two parts. First, one can consider plans with identical unit price pn = p^
and determine the fraction of agents that choose plan (p^; q^) over any other plan (p^; q)
through pairwise comparisons. Alternatively, one can ask individuals to directly choose
their preferred plan amongst all plans (p^; q) with unit price p^. This alternative formu-
lation entails less information, so identication here also implies identication under
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pairwise comparisons.13 The alternative formulation is exactly the setup in textbook
insurance models where individuals choose the optimal quantity of insurance at given
unit price to cover a binary risk (see for example Kreps 1990, Varian 1992, Mas-Colell,
Whinston and Greene 1995, Gravelle and Rees 2004). In our notation, this corresponds
to the selection of an insurance plan from a menuMp^ = f(P; q) jP=q = p^; q 2 R+g, and
from choice data we can observe the fraction of agents D(qjMp^) buying an unrestricted
coverage level q 2 R+ o¤ered at unit price p^, as well as the cumulative ~D(qjMp^) of
agents that choose a coverage level no larger than q: For notational convenience and
to highlight the connection to standard results, we continue with this textbook model,
instead of pairwise plan comparisons.14
This leads to the second step for identication: we also need variation in unit
prices. Observing the fraction of individuals choosing between di¤erent coverage levels
at constant unit price is not informative about risk or preference: following the logic of
Lemma 2, the type sets B (qjMp^) for any available coverage choice q do not intersect as
the price per unit of coverage remains constant, and we are in a choice environment akin
to those depicted in Figure 3. However, consider randomly assigning groups to di¤erent
unit prices. That is, for a rst random cross-section we observe their insurance choices
from Mph and for a second cross-section we observe choices from Mpl . Consumers
with the same coverage choice for the price ph may choose di¤erent coverage levels at
the reduced price pl < ph. The di¤erence in willingness to buy additional coverage as
prices change depends on the di¤erence in their preferences and risks. In particular,
due to the decreasing returns to coverage, the type with higher risk aversion (but lower
risk) will increase her coverage less when the price decreases to pl. This implies that
the type sets B (qjMph) will be atter than the type sets B (qjMpl) at their respective
intersections and allows us to use the di¤erence in coverage shares to disentangle the
heterogeneity in risk and preferences.
The textbook model allows for a direct illustration of this intuition. An individual
13 Intuitively, for a given agent, pairwise comparisons provide strictly more information, since it
provides pairwise information even for choices that are not optimal to this particular agent. This
intuition does not simply generalize for our comparison: in the textbook model one observes the
optimal choice among many contracts for any given individual, while in the binary comparisions one
does not see the preferred choice for one particular individual but only the relative attractiveness overall
accross individuals. Nevertheless, note that in the textbook model, for a given agent the optimal choice
q is unique as his utility is strictly concave in q: Consider now an agent who has to choose between
two options q0 and q00 who are either both larger or both smaller then his optimal q. Because of
concavity he prefers the choice that is closest to his optimal choice. Now consider a binary choice set
M = fXq; Xq+"g where both options have same unit price p but Xq has quantity q while Xq+" has
quantity q + ": By the preceeding argument, all agents whose unconstraint choice q is below q prefer
Xq; while those whose unconstrained choice is above q + " prefer Xq+": For " su¢ ciently small, the
mass of agents that prefer the middle vanishes, and we have uncovered the fraction of agents that
have optimal choices below q as those that choose Xq: Formally, considering a sequence of populations
we have lim"!0D (Xq+"jfXq; Xq+"g) =
R q
D(xjMp^)dx: So pairwise comparisions entail at least the
information from the textbook model.
14While, as mentioned before, pairwise plan comparisons provide in this setting at least the same
information as what the textbook model provides, this is not generally true. We will discuss this further
in Section 4.
20
chooses the level of coverage such that the marginal rate of substitution for her type
equals the rate at which transfers can be made between the good and the bad state (as
implied by the unit price),

1  
u0 (mb (q) j)
u0 (mg (q) j) =
p
1  p . (8)
An individual buys more coverage than another because she faces a higher risk or
because she is more risk-averse. The variation in coverage choices across individuals
at a constant price p could therefore be entirely driven by heterogeneity in preferences
or heterogeneity in risks alone. Now taking logs on both sides of equation (8) and
approximating log [u0 (mbj) =u0 (mgj)] =  u
00(mg j)
u0(mg j) [mg  mb], we nd an individuals
demand for coverage as a function of the unit price,
q = A+B log (p= [1  p]) (9)
with
A = L 
log


1 

u00 (mgj) =u0 (mgj) and B =
1
u00 (mgj) =u0 (mgj) . (10)
While both higher risk and higher risk aversion increases coverage choices, the response
to a change in the price only depends on risk aversion. Those with higher risk aversion
tend to increase their coverage less and are thus less responsive to a change in the price.
The above approximation is exact for CARA preferences. For such preferences there
is a one-to-one mapping between (A;B) and (; ) ; since A = L + log (=(1  )) =
and B =  1=. Therefore, the distribution H can be identied from the distribution
of A and B in the population. We will show that su¢ cient price variation allows for
such identication. The key step in this argument is to observe that prices determine
the share of people with (A;B) for whom A+B  t along any ray dened by  and
 and for any parameter t: In particular,
Pr(A+ B  t) = Pr

A+


B  t


= D

t

jMp(;)

, (11)
where D
 
t
 jMp(;)

is the observed share of people that buy no more insurance than
q = t= for for p(; )  exp ( =) =[1 + exp ( =)]. With su¢ cient price variation
this can be observed for any level of ;  and t. This amounts to observing the marginal
distribution (11) of the weighted sum of A and B; for all possible weights.
The remaining question is whether we can learn the joint distribution over A and
B from observing all such marginal distributions over the sums of A and B. Cai,
Zhang and Peng (2005) provide an a¢ rmative answer based on a proof in the space
of characteristic functions which we replicate in the appendix to make our arguments
self-contained. This yields the following insight:
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Proposition 4 Consider a binary risk k 2 f0; Lg, a choice setMp with constant unit
price and CARA preferences. When observing the distribution of coverage choices in
Mp for each price p 2 [0; 1], we can fully identify the distribution H for any permissable
set of observations.
Proof. See appendix.
Full identication of the non-parametric type distribution requires innite variation
in the unit price of insurance. However, with limited price variation, we can still
reject homogeneity in preferences and risks and uncover key moments of the respective
distributions. This can be seen along the following lines. The demand specication in
(9) for CARA preferences implies
V ar (qjp) = V ar (A) + V ar   1 ~p2   2Cov  A;  1 ~p (12)
for ~p = log (p= [1  p]) : Hence, with two exogenous prices, we obtain
[V ar (qjp1)  V ar (qjp2)] = [~p1   ~p2] = V ar
 
 1
 [~p1 + ~p2]  2Cov  A;  1 . (13)
We can use this to test for homogeneity in preferences and risks. This is easy to see
for the preference types - the argument for the risk types is relegated to the appendix.
Whenever the di¤erence in variances in equation (13) is di¤erent from 0, we can reject
that  (or  1) is constant and thus that the preference type is homogeneous. For
a constant , both V ar
 
 1

and Cov
 
A;  1

would be equal to 0. Finally, when
observing three (exogenous) prices, we can also identify the variance of the inverse of
the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion
V ar
 
 1

=
h
V ar(qjp1) V ar(qjp2)
~p1 ~p2  
V ar(qjp2) V ar(qjp3)
~p2 ~p3
i
= [~p1   ~p3] .
To summarize:
Proposition 5 Consider a binary risk k 2 f0; Lg, choice sets Mp with constant unit
price and CARA preferences. Rejecting homogeneity in preferences (risks) is possible
when observing the distribution of coverage choices in Mp for two prices in the unit
interval. We can identify the variance in (inverse) preference types when observing the
distribution of coverage choices inMp for three prices.
Proof. See appendix.
In this textbook model the progress we can make with claims data instead of price
variation is limited, for reasons akin to those mentioned in Section 3.1. Note that
when we restrict attention to CARA preferences like in Proposition 4, claims data
would be su¢ cient to reject homogeneity in preferences, but does not allow to identify
any additional moments capturing the variation in preferences or risks. The issue
is that we cannot establish or reject homogeneity in preference or risk types for the
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individuals choosing the same coverage level q at unit price p. The observed share
of losses D (Ljq; p) pins down only the average risk type among these individuals and
a preference type that rationalizes the coverage choice given this average risk type.
Hence, there is no way to identify heterogeneity in preferences or risks beyond these
average types that rationalize the respective coverage choices.15
Finally, note that in lieu of simple binary menus we introduced the text-book ap-
proach with several plans o¤ered jointly. However, we restricted the menu to o¤er
plans with constant unit price, providing limited opportunities for identication within
a single menu. In the next section we discuss how multiple options o¤ered together in
a single menu can help uncover the underlying heterogeneity.
4 From Theory to Practice
In this section, we do two things to show how to implement our identication approach
in practice. First, we move beyond binary risks and simple insurance plans. In practice,
costs can take many values and insurance plans are often complex. The coverage that an
insurance plan provides depends on the size and type of costs. For example, health plans
typically specify deductibles, co-insurance rates and out-of-pocket maxima. Variation
in these plan features helps identify type heterogeneity when (like in the binary case)
these features di¤erentially attract types along di¤erent dimensions. The increase in
the dimensionality of the contract space - keeping xed the dimensionality of the type
space - provides additional opportunities for identication.
Second, we show how within-menu plan variation can be used for identication even
if there is no between-menu plan variation (obtained via random variation in menus
faced by similar individuals). Even choices from a single menu can be informative
enough to place bounds on the distribution of types. This approach is particularly
useful, as within-menu plan variation naturally arises in many settings, while between-
menu variation typically requires experiments or quasi-experimental variation.
4.1 Plans and Expenses in Practice
When costs are continuous, a plan X can in principle specify any out-of-pocket expense
x (k) for each possible cost k 2 R+. We focus on three pre-dominant coverage features
of insurance plans: a deductible D, below which all costs are paid out-of-pocket by
the individual, an out-of-pocket maximum M above which the out-of-pocket expenses
cannot increase, and a co-insurance rate  determining the individuals cost share in
15Moreover, when we observe a higher loss probability among the individuals who buy more coverage,
in the spirit of Proposition 2, and we were to allow for any risk-averse preference type represented by
some concave utility function u (:), we can always construct a homogeneous preference type ex post
that rationalizes the choice and claims data with only heterogeneity in risk types.
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between. The out-of-pocket expense equals
x (k) =
8>><>>:
k for k  D;
D +  (k  D) for k 2
h
D; 1M   1  D
i
;
M for k > 1M   1  D.
Simple Plans Covering High Expenses We rst show that the logic for iden-
tication remains essentially identical to the arguments from the previous sections if
contracts cover high but not low expenses: consider insurance plans that set the de-
ductible equal to the out-of-pocket maximum (i.e., Z  D = M). This induces full cost
sharing below Z but no cost sharing above Z. Now, the setting resembles our stylized
setting with binary risks studied before. The valuation of the insurance plan depends
crucially on the probability 1  F (Zj) that the coverage is received.
Both high risk aversion and high expected costs increase the willingness to pay for
such a plan. We can compute the marginal willingness to reduce the threshold Z when
the plan charges a premium P , analogous to (5). Alternatively we can invert this to
get an expression analogous to the marginal rate of substitution (6) that guided our
understanding in the binary risk case:
dP
dZ jU(Xj;)
1  dPdZ jU(Xj;)
=   [1  F (Zj)]u
0 ( P   Zj)R Z
0 u
0 ( P   kj) f(kj)dk
=  1  F (Zj)
F (Zj)
u0 ( P   Zj)
E [u0 ( P   kj) jk  Z;] . (14)
The basic structure of this expression is very similar to (6) in the binary case. If risk
types can be ranked in a rst-order stochastic dominant way (i.e., F (kji)  F (kjj) for
all k), we have that both individuals with higher risk and with higher risk aversion have
a higher willingness-to-pay for additional coverage. However, the returns to coverage
tend to decrease more rapidly for individuals with higher risk aversion. If among the
marginal buyers of a plan, the marginal willingness to pay is indeed higher for those
with higher risk but lower risk aversion, we can again invoke Lemma 2 and establish
rotations of the type frontiers by changing the coverage and price paid.16 Su¢ cient
variation in prices and coverage allows us to uncover the underlying heterogeneity in
the spirit of Proposition 4.
Plans Covering High vs. Low Expenses In practice, plans also di¤er in the
type of expenses they cover: a plan could have lower deductible, but a higher out-of-
pocket maximum, as well as di¤erent coinsurance rates. We will see that this can o¤er
an additional channel for identication.
16Note that a risk-neutral type is indi¤erent about buying when (1  F (Zj))E (k   Zjk > Z; ) =
P . By analogy to the binary case, to obtain a crossing of the type frontiers, we would need the expected
coverage to increase by more than the price for this indi¤erent risk-neutral type.
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The marginal expected utility from lowering the out-of-pocket expense x (k) for a
given cost k equals
dU (Xj; ) = f (kj)u0 (x (k) j) dx:
The willingness to purchase additional coverage depends on the probability of the
underlying cost (which is determined by the risk type ) and the utility from reducing
the out-of-pocket expense (which is determined by the risk preference ).
Arbitrary non-linear insurance plans could vary the out-of-pocket expenses for each
cost realization k. Such plan variation allows separating heterogeneity in risk and
preferences. Yet even standard insurance contracts provide valuable identication. Out-
of-pocket maxima, for example, a¤ect the coverage for high expenses, while deductibles
a¤ect coverage for low expenses. For given risks, individuals with high risk aversion
care more about reducing high out-of-pocket expenses than reducing low out-of-pocket
expenses. In particular, a type with extreme risk aversion chooses based on the out-
of-pocket maximum and premium only, trying to reduce spending in the worst case, in
which both are paid. As a result, decreasing the wedge between out-of-pocket maximum
and deductible attracts the more risk-averse and discourages the less risk-averse types
from buying insurance. This tends to rotate the decreasing type frontier counter-
clockwise.
How much individuals with di¤erent risk care about reducing the out-of-pocket
maximum rather than the deductible depends on the likelihood ratio of the di¤erent
expenses. Starting from a contract for which deductible and out-of-pocket maximum
coincide at Z, the marginal willingness to reduce the deductible relative to the out-of-
pocket maximum simplies to the product of co-insurance and hazard rate:
dM
dD
jU(Xj;) = (1  )
f (Zj)
1  F (Zj) . (15)
If the hazard rate were to decrease for higher risk types, they care more about reducing
the out-of-pocket maximum.17 Decreasing the wedge between the out-of-pocket max-
imum and deductible then tends to rotate type frontiers clockwise. Whether we can
establish a clean identication result like Lemma 2 will depend on these potentially
opposing forces.
4.2 Within-Menu Plan Variation
In practice, we often observe individuals picking a plan out of a menu providing the
choice between several, di¤erent plans. We demonstrate how within-menu variation in
plans can still be exploited for identication and link this to the between-menu variation
17Note that when risk types are ranked by rst-order stochastic dominance, this does not imply that
the hazard rate and thus the marginal rate of substitution between D andM is monotone. A monotone
likelihood ratio property for the risk types (i.e., f (k + "j) =f (kj) increasing in  for " > 0), however,
would imply both a rst-order stochastic dominance ranking and a monotone hazard rates.
25
in plans analyzed before.
The rst practical insight is that if identication is not possible for plans o¤ered
in di¤erent menus (i.e. from between-menu variation, as in our previous setting),
identication is not possible either when these plans are o¤ered together (i.e. from
within-menu variation). This is the case when type frontiers do not intersect, as in
Figure 3. Consider again our original binary risk setting, but now with contracts
Xh and Xl o¤ered together in a three-plan menu M = f;; Xl; Xhg. If contract Xh
provides more insurance at higher unit price (such that T (;; Xh) lies above T (;; Xl)),
identication is not possible using choices from this menu, as any di¤erent choice can
be explained either by higher risk aversion or higher risk. Starting from a type that
buys no insurance, an agent switches rst to the low-coverage plan Xl, when increasing
either her risk or preference type, and eventually to the high-coverage plan Xh.18
The counterpart of this result is that plan variation that leads to identication
across menus can also provide identication when plan are o¤ered together in one
menu. Consider any two plans Xj and Xj0 for which the type frontiers T (;; Xj) and
T  ;; Xj0 intersect, as illustrated before in Figure 4. The type (; ) at the intersection
of the two frontiers is indi¤erent between all three options (including the outside option
;). This type (; ) is a natural candidate to provide a bound on the support of one
of the two plans.
We illustrate this in our original binary risk setting. Consider again contracts Xh
and Xl, but with Xh providing more coverage at lower price per unit. Figure 5 plots
the di¤erent type sets corresponding to the choice of each of the plans when the plans
are o¤ered within the same menuM = f;; Xl; Xhg. The low-coverage plan provides an
intermediate option, but as it charges a higher price per unit of coverage, this is only
attractive to individuals with relatively high risk aversion (and relatively low risk type).
Such individuals strongly value the basic coverage provided by the low-coverage plan,
but place less value on the additional coverage provided by the high-coverage plan.
Hence, when increasing the risk type of an individual with risk aversion higher than
, she will rst switch from no insurance to the low-coverage plan before eventually
switching to the high-coverage plan. In contrast, individuals with risk aversion lower
than  will never buy the low-coverage plan. Their marginal valuation of coverage is
more constant. As a consequence, these individuals remain uninsured when their risk
type is low, but switch immediately to the high-coverage plan (charging a low price per
unit) when their risk type is high.
In Figure 5 this gives rise to an area above  where agents buy Xl; but not below.
As a consequence, the share of individuals buying the low-coverage plan Xl places a
18Note that the agent will switch to the low-coverage plan when crossing the type frontier
T (;; Xl) and to the high-coverage plan when crossing type frontier T (Xl; Xh). The latter lies above
T (;; Xh) in this case and does intersect with T (;; Xl) either. The share of individuals buying the low-
coverage plan Xl allows us to allocate mass to the parameter region in between the loci T (;; Xl) and
T (Xl; Xh), but this variation is not su¢ cient to place any bounds on the heterogeneity in preferences.
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Figure 5: The gure shows the choices for types in (; )-space from the menu
C = f;; Xl; Xhg. The lines show the type frontiers for any binary choice. All type
frontiers intersect at (; ). Like in Figure 4, the low-coverage plan charges a higher
price per unit of coverage and therefore di¤erentially attracts types with high risk
aversion (and low risk).
lower bound on 1   H (). The following Lemma summarizes identication using
within-menu variation, in line with the potential of between-menu variation described
in Lemma 2:
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 1, the three type sets rationalizing the respective plan
choices from the menu M = f;; Xl; Xhg with qh > ql meet at a unique pair (; ) if
and only if Ph > PL and Pl=ql > Ph=qh. Moreover,Z

Z

dH  D (XljM) .
Proof. See appendix.
Comparing Lemmas 2 and 3, we note two important di¤erences from observing
plan shares when plans are o¤ered jointly rather than pairwise. First, for a given set of
plans, the plan shares when all plans are o¤ered jointly allow for tighter bounds. For
pairwise comparisons the bounds need to be constructed using share di¤erentials. The
rotations of the type frontiers imply that plans di¤erentially attract and discourage
individuals from buying the plan, but we only observe the net di¤erences. Second,
depending on the underlying distribution the net di¤erence may be positive or negative,
which results in either a lower or upper bound on the support. For a given set of
plans, with all plans o¤ered jointly, the bounds only go in one direction, regardless of
the underlying distribution.19 However, this would not be an issue in more complex
19This is due to our restricted contract space in the binary risk framework. The dimensionality of
the contract space and decreasing returns to coverage make that T (;; Xh) is a clockwise rotation of
T (;; Xl) if and only if Phqh <
Pl
ql
, which implies that the type frontier T (Xl; Xh) is a clockwise rotation
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contractual environments for which the dimensionality exceeds the dimensionality of
the type space as we demonstrate in our empirical application. Such environments
allow for bounds from both sides, which are necessary to reject homogeneity.
5 Application toMassachusettsHealth Insurance Exchange
In this section, we use health insurance plan choices by consumers on the Massa-
chusetts Health Insurance Exchange (HIX) to illustrate our identication method. We
use within-menu plan variation and derive informative bounds on the CDFs of risk
preferences and expected costs of these consumers.
5.1 Exchange Context and Choice Menu
Established by the 2006 Massachusetts Health Reform, the Massachusetts HIX is the
forerunner of the HIXs established across the U.S. by the 2010 A¤ordable Care Act
(ACA). Data from the Massachusetts HIX allows us to examine consumer choice from a
menu with a variety of plans, o¤ered at posted prices on a guaranteed issue, non-health
rated basis. We examine the choices of rst-time choosers on the exchange, so that
choices are active choicesuncontaminated by inertia (Ericson 2014, Handel 2013).20
On the HIX, plans are available in multiple tiers based on actuarial value (the
fraction of health care costs that would be insured for a representative sample of the
population). In the time period we consider (January and February 2010), cost-sharing
characteristics were standardized across insurers within each tier of quality: bronze
low, bronze medium, bronze high, silver low, silver medium, gold. As a result, a bronze
low plan would have the same deductible, coinsurance, and maximum out of pocket
spending regardless of which insurer it was o¤ered by.21
The menu of plans was designed by the HIX regulator, while prices were set by
individual insurers. Within each tier, multiple insurers compete, o¤ering plans that
di¤er in premiums, brand and insurer network. Premiums thus vary by plan tier and
by insurers. However, due to modied community rating regulation, the premium for a
given insurer-plan combo is only allowed to vary by geography and age. In particular,
premiums are only allowed to di¤er for each 5-year age group. This provides arguably
exogenous price variation for comparable populations around age cut-o¤s, but one
would need a larger sample to achieve su¢ cient statistical power to use this between-
menu plan variation (as analyzed in Subsection 3.3). However, all age groups can
of T (;; Xh). In a more complex contractual environment, T (X1; X2) can still be a counter-clockwise
rotation of T (;; X1) when T (;; X2) is a clockwise rotation of T (;; X1). This allows for bounds in the
opposite direction.
20The HIX is described in detail in Ericson and Starc (2012a, 2012b).
21Ericson and Starc (2013) describes the standardization process in more detail. The Massachusetts
HIX tiers in this time period are slightly di¤erent from the ACA tiers for instance, gold on the
Massachusetts HIX is similar to Platinum on the ACA exchanges.
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choose from a menu with several plans di¤ering in coverage and price. We use this
within-menu plan variation for identication (as analyzed in Subsection 4.2).
In order to model choice from this menu, we translate each plan design into a sim-
plied plan design characterized solely by a deductible D, a coinsurance rate , and
maximum out-of-pocket spending M . In a contract characterized solely by these para-
meters, an individuals out of pocket spending is simply a plan-specic function of their
total spending. However, contracts are in fact quite complex, with per-visit copayments
that vary based on service used and per admission charges to the hospital. Modeling
choice from such a complex contract would require modeling a very detailed level of
health care utilization: for instance, how often consumers expect to use each type of
specialist, each tier of prescription drug, and di¤erentiating between expenditures for
lab tests, durable medical equipment, allergy treatment, and inpatient spending. Our
simplication procedure is also reasonable since it is unlikely that consumers observed,
understood, and had well-formed expectations of the probability that they would use
each of these varied services.
To translate the actual plan design into a simplied plan design X, we entered
the original characteristics of each plan into the Center for Consumer Information &
Insurance Oversights (CCIIO) actuarial value calculator including details such as
per visit copayments, which produced an estimated actuarial value (AV) for that plan.
Then, we solve for the coinsurance rate (given that plans actual deductible D and
maximum OOP M) that would produce the same AV for the simplied version of
each plan characterized by (D;;M).22 We explore results using a variety of other
alternative plan translations in the Empirical Appendix (see Appendix Figure A.2).
Table 1 presents the results of this exercise, while Table A.1 describes the detailed
design of the plans as sold on the Massachusetts HIX.23 Premiums are di¤erent for
each 5-year age group; we present the premiums for the lowest and highest priced age
group, and focus our analysis on these groups.24
Plans in the table are ordered by their actuarial value, from least to most generous.
While the actuarial values of the Bronze plans are quite similar, the plans vary in
where they apply coverage: Bronze High has a very low deductible but correspondingly
22However, because the actual plans did indeed provide some coverage for spending below deductible
(e.g. a $100 doctors visit resulted in a $30 copay even if the deductible was not met), our method
underestimated the degree of coinsurance. While the results were reasonably representative of the plans
characteristics, this method produced a 0% coinsurance rate for the Bronze Medium plan, even though
this plan in fact did include cost-sharing after the deductible. We used a corrected coinsurance of 5%
for Bronze Medium, based on dividing the $500 hospital copay (as in the original plan characteristics)
by the mean 2010 hospital stay cost of $9700 (as reported in Pfuntner, Wier and Steiner 2013).
23 In some months, a Silver Medium plan is also o¤ered; when it is, we drop it from our plan menu,
along with the small number of people who choose it from our calculation of market shares. Because
the remainder of the individuals revealed they preferred one of the other plans to Silver Medium,
our bounds are still describing the preferences and beliefs of our sample population. (The bounds we
present are slightly looser than if we had used information about Silver Medium.)
24Premiums are averaged over the two months (there is small variation between January and Febru-
ary) and across zipcodes for all people o¤ered the Neighborhood Health Plan (most people live in the
Boston region).
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higher coinsurance than Bronze Medium; all Bronze plans have the same maximum
OOP. (Note that despite having a slightly higher actuarial value than Bronze Medium,
Bronze High is priced slightly lower.) Silver Low is quite di¤erent as it has a lower
maximum OOP, but a higher deductible relative to Bronze High. Silver High and Gold
are quite similar again: both have zero deductible and a maximum OOP of $2000.
While Gold is more generous based on actuarial value and has a lower coinsurance
rate, it has higher premiums.
While multiple insurers o¤er plans, we focus our analysis on the price menu of the
most popular insurer (Neighborhood Health Plan), which has approximately 50% mar-
ket share. (The price for each plan design varies across insurers; we have explored using
the prices for other insurers, which give similar results.) In all cases, our results apply
to the population of individuals who chose this insurer. We do not explicitly model
individuals choice of insurers. Tighter bounds could be obtained by modeling indi-
vidualspattern of substitution between insurers, but we have limited data to identify
these patterns.25
The nal columns of Table 1 present market shares for the plan designs, broken
down by broad age groups. Though prices vary by 5 year age groups, we group those
above and below age 45 to get more accurate estimates of market shares (doing so
reduced sampling error). See Appendix Table A.2 for detailed market shares within
each 5 year age bin category.
5.2 Individual Model of Choice
We model individuals as having CARA utility over consumption: u ( P   x (k)) =
  exp ( (P + x (k))) =, where OOP expenses x (k) are a function of the individuals
healthcare spending k and the insurance plan they choose. Individuals vary on two
dimensions. First, they vary in their CARA coe¢ cient . Second, they vary in their
beliefs about the distribution of their own healthcare spending. While there are many
dimensions on which individuals might vary in their distributional beliefs, we summarize
variation in expected claims in a single risk-type index, . For each risk-type , the
expected claims distribution is assumed to follow a log normal distribution withmean =
 and variance = 4053

1
2  10451
2
. Note that variance of expenditures scales with the
mean expected risk. We take the $4053 mean spending number from the 2010 Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey, persons with private insurance. The standard deviation
25Our model is consistent with a variety of di¤erent ways in which individuals trade o¤ their preferred
plan design versus price and preferred insurer. For instance, individuals could make a hierarchical
decision, choosing their preferred insurer rst (based on insurer network versus insurers average price),
then choosing their preferred plan design. Then, our results simply describe the population of people
whose preferred insurer was Neighborhood Health Plan. Alternatively, an individual may have a more
complex pattern of substitution for instance, a Blue Cross Bronze High plan may be the closest
substitute to a Neighborhood Health Plan Silver Low plan. In this case, our bounds on preferences and
beliefs still describe the population of individuals whose preferred plan was o¤ered by Neighborhood
Health Plan, since the plan they chose was indeed revealed preferred to all other plans o¤ered by this
insurer.
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of expenses is $10451. Someone with  = 4053 has the population average as his
or her mean claim, but because individuals have information about their own risk
type (age, gender, particular diseases, and expected patterns of care), we assume the
individuals expected standard deviation is half the population standard deviation.
Little is known about risk types and their structure. Under our assumptions, the
variance of claims is lower for an individual with lower mean expected claims.26 We
have explored alternative variance assumptions, including a model of constant variance
of claims across all risk types.27 Note as well that we have assumed no moral hazard:
expected healthcare spending is the same, regardless of which contract individuals
choose.
To determine what can be learned from consumers choosing from the menu of
options in Table 1, we construct a grid of (; ) pairs, with  ranging from 10 15
to 0:5 10 2 and  ranging from 1=100 the population expected claims (about $40 in
expected claims) to 5 times the population expected claims (about $20; 000 in expected
claims). Each (; ) pair represents a combination of expected healthcare costs and
risk aversion. We then calculate the plan that maximizes expected utility for each pair.
The rst column of Figure 6 displays the optimal plan choice for the youngest group
(Panel A, upper panel) and oldest group (Panel B, lower panel). Recall that prices vary
between age groups, and the older group faces a higher marginal cost of more generous
coverage. For both groups, only individuals with relatively low expected costs choose
the Bronze Low (dark black) plan: it is chosen for only the lowest value of  in Panel
A, and the lowest two values of  in Panel B. It is attractive for all individuals with
such low expected costs regardless of risk aversion. Bronze Medium is similar to Bronze
Low but with a lower coinsurance rate and priced slightly higher. It is only chosen by
the older consumers at this set of relative prices (it does not appear in Panel A), and
attracts relatively risk averse, but low-risk individuals. Bronze High is the most popular
plan with a market share of 40:2% and 29:0% for the young and old respectively. The
plan is attractive to relatively risk-neutral individuals with a wide range of expected
claims, and to low expected-cost individuals with a wide range of risk aversion. The
plan has a low deductible ($250 vs. $2000 for the other Bronze plans) and is cheaper
than Bronze Medium, but has a higher co-insurance rate above the deductible.
Turning to Silver plans, we nd that individuals with the highest expected costs
choose Silver Low rather than Silver High; individuals with intermediate expected costs
choose Silver High.28 While the two silver plans have the same maximum OOP, the
Silver High plan has a lower deductible but higher coinsurance; from the perspective of
risk averse individuals, paying for rst dollar coverage is less valuable than paying for
26For instance, both the mean and variance of medical spending rises with age.
27Appendix Figure A.1 shows how choices would shift if alternative variance structures were assumed.
Intuitively, higher variance at a given amount of expected costs tends to increase demand for insurance.
28Silver High is slightly more generous than Silver Low (both in the sense of actuarial value and of
higher premiums):
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lower coinsurance. Despite the fact that Silver Low is preferred for many (; ) pairs,
the market share of Silver Low is relatively small: only about 3%. This indicates that
there is not a large subset of the population with both very high risk aversion and very
high expected claims.
Finally, note that no one in this menu chooses a Gold plan: its only advantage
over Silver High is lower coinsurance, but it has substantially higher premiums. Thus,
even though the Gold plan has the highest actuarial value, it exposes individuals to
a worse worst-case scenario than the Silver plans. Someone who hits the maximum
OOP of $2000 in both Silver High and Gold will spend more in the Gold plan due to
the higher premiums (an additional $1392 at the premiums faced by older individuals).
This explains why Gold is actually less attractive than Silver for someone who is very
risk averse and expects to hit the OOP maximum.29
5.3 Bounds from Plan Choices
From these choices, we can use the plan shares in Table 1 to construct bounds on the
CDFs of  and . Column 2 of Figure 6 presents CDFs of each independently. The
upper panel shows that choice provides virtually no restriction on the distribution of
risk preferences in the population facing the young prices. Any single choice of the
risk aversion parameter  (except the most risk neutral one) could rationalize all the
choices. The only restriction on the distribution is that individuals choosing Silver Low
cannot have the most risk neutral value of . This bound, however, is coming from our
restriction on the domain of risk types, having assumed that an individuals expected
claims cannot exceed $20; 000.
The bottom panel of Figure 6 shows that there must be at least some relatively
risk-averse individuals to rationalize choice for older individuals given the prices they
face. The bound is coming from the di¤erence in plan features between Bronze and
Silver plans which di¤erentially attract types along the risk and preference dimension.
Bronze Medium o¤ers relatively generous coverage for intermediate costs and only
attracts types with risk aversion   I = 9:32 10 4. Types with lower risk aversion
should either buy Bronze High, providing more generous coverage for low costs, or
Silver Low, providing more generous coverage for high costs. Similarly, we nd that
Silver High only attracts types with risk aversion   II = 0:0011:30
In line with Lemma 3, the share of older individuals with risk aversion greater than
II = 0:0011, 1   H (II), is at least as high the market share of Silver High and
thus provides an upper bound on the CDF. The share of individuals with risk aversion
above I = 9:32  10 4 is at least the sum of the market shares of Silver High and
29The market share of Gold is relatively small (only 8% for the old), but non-zero. In exploratory
analysis, we do nd that the plan becomes rationalizable under certain menus and variance assumptions.
30Types with lower risk aversion and relatively low risk should buy Bronze, providing lower coverage
but at substantially lower premium. Types with lower risk aversion but high risk should again buy
Silver Low.
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Bronze Medium, providing a tighter upperbound on the CDF for this lower level of
risk aversion. Despite our informative upper bound on the CDF, we cannot reject
homogeneity in risk preferences because the available plan variation does not place any
lower bounds on the CDF. As a consequence, we can t a degenerate CDF that jumps
from zero to one for risk-aversion levels above II = 0:0011. So while we can reject
that all individuals would have relatively low risk aversion, we cannot reject that all
individuals have some relatively high yet homogeneous risk aversion.
Turning to the distribution of risk types (), we note that for each bound on risk
aversion coming from the plan variation corresponds to a bound on risk as well. For
example, Bronze Medium attracts types who not only have relatively high risk aversion
(  I), but also expect low costs (  I = $1170). Types with higher expected
costs prefer the higher actuarial value of Bronze High or Silver depending on their risk
preferences. The same is true for Silver High, which only attracts types with expected
expenses   II = $1067. In addition, the choice of Bronze Low, which provides
the lowest coverage, can only be rationalized for types with very low expected costs
(  III = $383). The cumulative market shares of Bronze Low, Silver High and
Bronze Medium provide a lower bound on the CDF of expected costs at respectively
III ; II and I . This is illustrated in the bottom gure of Column 2 of Figure 6
For the distribution of risk types, the market shares can also be used to provide
upper bounds on the CDF. When risk preferences cannot exceed the extremely risk
averse31  = 0:005, as illustrated in Column 1 of Figure 6, we nd strictly positive
lower bounds on the support of expected expenses for each of the plan choices other
than Bronze Low. The market shares for these plans allow us to construct upper
bounds on the CDF of expected costs. Note that when we relax the constraint on the
preference domain, we still nd informative lower bounds on the support for some plans.
For example, for the older individuals, Silver High (Bronze Medium) will only attract
types with expected expenses above $1069 ($383), regardless of the risk preferences.32
The derived upper and lower bounds on the CDF imply that we can reject homo-
geneity in expected expenses. (We cannot t a degenerate CDF jumping from 0 to
1 for some .) Hence, while we can rationalize the di¤erent plan choices with only
heterogeneity in expected expenses, we can not do it with only heterogeneity in risk
preferences. Note that we have considered a wide candidate range for (; ). To the
extent you are willing to put further restrictions on the range of reasonable parameters,
tighter bounds can be obtained.
31For  = 0:005; an individual is indi¤erent between getting $139 for certain and a 50-50 gamble for
$10,000 or $0.
32Note that also in the high-variance specication in Panel B of Appendix Figure A.1, we can only
rationalize Bronze Medium for a limited range of risk aversion parameters. The market share of Bronze
Medium thus provides both a lower and upperbound on the CDF.
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Figure 6: Choices and implied bounds on risk preferences and risk perceptions.
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5.4 Discussion
A large empirical literature has argued that heterogeneity in risk preferences is a key
feature of insurance markets and explains why adverse selection is a minor issue in
several markets. The implementation of our non-parametric approach does not allow
us to validate this claim in our empirical context. We cannot reject that all individuals
have the same preferences, while they must di¤er in their (perceived) risks.
The non-parametric bounds on risk preferences, using only plan variation, do not al-
low us to distinguish between quite extreme forms of preference heterogeneity. A more
structural approach could help to tighten bounds on preferences and prove complemen-
tary to our approach, but the tighter bounds would rely on the validity of the imposed
structure. For comparison, Figure 7 plots our bounds on CARA preferences for the old
group with some well-known examples in the insurance literature of parametric esti-
mates of CARA distributions using standard random utility models. These estimates
are obtained from di¤erent contexts and potentially very di¤erent populations. Our
bounds do not reject the vast dispersion in risk aversion estimated by Cohen and Einav
(2007), but are also consistent with the more homogeneous distribution estimated in
Handel and Kolstad (2015). Interestingly, this is no longer true for the estimates in
Handel and Kolstad (2015) obtained by augmenting the standard random utility model
with survey data on information frictions. This could indicate that it is not su¢ cient
to account for peoples risk perceptions, and that our expected utility model should be
augmented with other informational or behavioral frictions to provide consistent and
tighter bounds on preference heterogeneity. Finally, more plan variation would allow
us to further tighten bounds as well. The regulation of plan features or prices could
provide promising variation for identication.33
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown how to identify both consumer risk preferences and their risk
perceptions, using only insurance choice data. Our method uses variation in insurance
plans that di¤erentially attracts individuals along the preference and risk type dimen-
sions, exploiting the fact that marginal willingness to buy insurance is more rapidly
decreasing in coverage for individuals with high risk aversion (but low risk) than for
individuals with low risk aversion (but high risk).
Our approach allows us to relax strong assumptions about (rational) expectations
and parametric type distributions, as well as to identify preferences and risk percep-
tions when claims data is unavailable. We applied our method to the Massachusetts
33The discussed price variation across age groups would be useful for identication in combination
with within-menu plan variation. Comparing the type sets at the young prices and the old prices reveals
that changes in prices change the parameter values that bound the support of particular plans. When
the price variation is exogenous, plan share di¤erentials may be attributable to particular parameter
ranges and thus provide further bounds.
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Figure 7: Comparing bounds on risk preferences for older individuals on the Massa-
chusetts HIX to estimates from the literature
HIX. For these individuals, we can reject homogeneity in risks, but not homogeneity
in preferences. We estimate bounds on the distribution of preferences that are con-
sistent with other papers. We also highlight the type of variation that is necessary
to obtain tighter bounds on the distribution of preferences, which may be useful for
experimentalists eliciting preferences. Future empirical work could pair our approach
with claims data to directly test the assumption of rational expectations about individ-
ualsdistribution of insurance claims. Moreover, future theoretical work could change
the micro-foundations of the choice model (e.g., by adding loss aversion or ambiguity
aversion) and then analyze which type of plan variation would allow to identify the
primitives of that model.
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Table 1: HIX Plan Menu
Monthly Premium Market Share
Deductible Coinsurance Max OOP AV Youngest Oldest Under 45 Over 45
Bronze Low 2000 11.20% 5000 73.1 $193 $388 17.9% 19.9%
Bronze Medium 2000 5.00% 5000 79.8 $210 $420 7.0% 14.9%
Bronze High 250 15.40% 5000 85.2 $202 $405 40.2% 29.0%
Silver Low 1000 2.50% 2000 85.6 $273 $540 3.4% 2.9%
Silver High 0 12.20% 2000 92.2 $275 $543 19.6% 25.4%
Gold 0 10.30% 2000 93 $336 $659 12.0% 8.0%
Note: Deductible and maximum OOP are taken directly from the original plan design. Coinsurance rate calculated as dened in
the text. Actuarial values are calculated from original plan design using the CCIIO calculator. Premiums and market shares are
for Neighborhood Health Plan, Jan. and Feb. 2010. Premiums are averaged across the two sample months and across ZIP codes.40
A.1 Appendices
A.1.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that we consider insurance contracts (q 2 (0; L]) that are in principle ra-
tionalizable (P 2 (0; q)), and consumers with domain of risk types  2 [0; 1] and
risk-averse preference types  2 R+. An individual of type (; ) buys plan X if and
only if condition (4) is satised.
First, we show that preference homogeneity cannot be rejected. Assume that all
individuals have identical preference type  > 0: By (4), we can nd a su¢ ciently low
risk type l for which it is optimal to remain uninsured (choose ;) and a su¢ ciently
high risk type h for which it is optimal to buy insurance (choose X). Assigning the
appropriate fractions of agents to each of these risks then rationalizes the observed
choices.
Second, we cannot put any bounds on preferences. Assume a bound of the form
H()   for  > 0: Yet we just showed that any homogeneous  > 0 can rationalize
any dataset under appropriate risk assumptions, and therefore in particular  > .
Such a homogeneous  then means H() = 0; yielding a contradiction. Similarly, for
bound 1 H()   for  > 0; we get a contradiction by rationalizing the observations
for homogeneous   :
Regarding risk types, the restriction to risk-averse preferences implies that risk
types that would buy no insurance are bounded from above by risk type  = P=q,
corresponding to the risk for which a risk-neutral type is indi¤erent between X and ;.
Hence, we can use the share of individuals not buying insurance to bound H, but we
can still not reject homogeneity in risks. For any risk type  2 ["; P=q] for " > 0, by
Assumption 1 we can nd a (su¢ ciently low) preference type l for which it is optimal
to remain insured and a (su¢ ciently high) preference type h for which it is optimal to
buy insurance. The former is ensured because the risk-neutral agent is assumed to be in
the domain, and for the latter it is assumed that risks span up to innite risk aversion.
With homogeneous risk type  but appropriate fractions of agents with preference l
and l any fraction of observed choices can be rationalized.
Proof of Proposition 3
This proof provides rigor to the outline in the main text. Using Lemma 2, we
can nd two menus f;; Xhg and f;; Xlg with qh > ql that intersect at an interior
intersection (; ). If h = D (Xhj f;; Xhg) is higher than l = D (Xlj f;; Xlg), we
know that H ()  h   l and thus H ()  h   l for any    since the CDF
is (weakly) increasing. At the same time, 1   H ()  h   l and thus H () 
H ()  1 [h   l] for any   . Hence, the plan share di¤erence h l provides a
lower bound on the CDF of preferences (for   ) and its complement an upper bound
on the CDF of risks (for   ). Similarly, if h < l, the plan share di¤erence l h
A.1
places an upper bound on the CDF of preferences (for   ) and its complement an
upper bound on the CDF of risks (for   ). Hence, any permissable distribution
with h 6= l places a bound on the marginal CDFs.
Consider now a third menu f;; X 0hg, where the plan X 0h provides more coverage than
the previous high-coverage planXh (i.e., q0h > qh > ql). If the price of the new plan were
set at P 0h such that the price per unit of coverage remains unchanged relative to the old
high-coverage plan (P 0h=q
0
h = Ph=qh), the type (
0; 0) that is indi¤erent between these
two plans is the risk-neutral type (Ph=qh; 0); while otherwise Assumption 1 implies that
the type frontier T f;; X 0hg would be strictly steeper and therefore strictly above the
type frontier of the previous plan T f;; Xhg. Instead of this price, assume the price P 0h
is set slightly lower so that P
0
h=q
0
h < Ph=qh but still P
0
h=q
0
h  Ph=qh: The risk-neutral
type (Ph=qh; 0) now strictly prefers the new plan over the old high-coverage plan, but
by continuity the intersection (0; 0) between T f;; X 0hg and T f;; Xhg remains close
to (Ph=qh; 0): Since the intersection (; ) between the original plans T f;; Xhg and
T f;; Xlg was placed in the interior of the type space, it had strictly higher risk-aversion
and strictly lower risk than this risk-neutral type, and we have  > 0 and  < 0:
If now for a permissable distribution more agents choose the low contract Xl over
no insurance than choose the high contract Xh over no insurance (l > h), but also
more agents choose the new contract X 0h over no insurance than those that choose the
old high contract over no insurance (h < 0h  D (X 0hj f;; X 0hg)), we will have that
H ()  1   [l   h] < 1 while H (0)  0h   h > 0 by the logic of the rst
paragraph of this proof. Since a CDF is weakly increasing and 0 < , we cannot
t a degenerate CDF between this lower and upper bound. That is, the lower bound
becomes binding at 0, before the upper bound stops binding at . We can thus reject
homogeneity in preferences. The same is true for risks.
The nal step in the proof is to show that such a distribution exists. To do this,
dene for any risk  the preference l() that makes the person indi¤erent between no
insurance and the low contract, i.e., (; l()) 2 T f;; Xlg, when it exists. Otherwise,
l() = 0. Dene h() (0h()) analogously via indi¤erence between no insurance
and the high insurance (new higher insurance) contract. The non-empty set of types
l;h = f(; )jh() >  > l()g then prefer the low contract to no insurance which
they prefer to the original high contract. Similarly, the non-empty set of types h0;h =
f(; )jh() >  > 0h()g prefer the new contract to no insurance which they prefer to
the old high coverage contract. Now we can construct a type distribution H by placing
strictly positive mass on types both in l;h and in h0;h; but nowhere else. This implies
that l > 0; 0h > 0 but h = 0; which fullls the premise of the previous paragraph
(as do an uncountable number of other distributions with less stark properties).
Proof of Proposition 4
Equation (11) in the main text showed that F(;)(t) = Pr(A+B  t) is observed
for all ;  and t: So we observe the marginal distribution F(;) of A+B, for all ; :
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Therefore we know its characteristic function F^(;)() for all  and :We are interested
in the joint cumulative distribution function F (A;B) over A and B; or equivalently in
its characteristic function F^ (a; b):
The following just recalls the denition of the characteristic function for a random
vector in Rk with cumulative distribution function G(x) with x 2 Rk. Its characteristic
function G^(!) with ! 2 Rk is dened as
G^(!) =
Z
ei!
T xdG(x)
where !T is the transpose of ! and i is the imaginary unit.
The remaining identication follows the proof in Cai, Zhang and Peng (2005). At
any value of  and  we can apply the denition of the characteristic function twice
(once for the two-dimensional random vector and once for the one-dimensional marginal
random vector) to obtain
F^ (; ) =
Z
ei(A+B)dF
=
Z
ei(A+B)dF = F^(;)():
Therefore, F^(;)(1) varied over all  and  identies F^ (; ) and therefore identies
F (A;B). Finally, by the one-to-one mapping between (A;B) and (; ) in case of
CARA preferences, this identies the distribution of risk and preference types as well.
Proof of Proposition 5.
It is left to show that we can test for homogeneity in risks with two prices. For this
we can use equations (12) - (13) for the variance and we can exploit similar expressions
for the average:
E (qjp) = E (A)  E   1 ~p; and
E (qjp1)  E (qjp2) = E
 
 1
 [~p2   ~p1] (16)
Using the fact that A = L+ log


1 

 1 under CARA, we know that if the the risk
type  were to be homogenous, we could infer the homogeneous risk type from
E (qjp) = E (A)  E   1 ~p
= L+ log


1  

E
 
 1

+ E
 
 1
 ~p,
where we know E
 
 1

from the di¤erence in coverage choices in (16). For a homoge-
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neous risk type, we also know that
V ar (A) = log


1  
2
V ar
 
 1

Cov
 
A;  1

= log


1  

V ar
 
 1

.
and thus
V ar (qjpk) = V ar (A) + V ar
 
 1
 ~p2k   2Cov (A;B) ~pk
=
"
log


1  
2
+ ~p2k   2 log


1  

~pk
#
V ar
 
 1

.
Hence, we can reject homogeneity in risk types if
V ar (qjp1)
V ar (qjp2) 6=
log


1 
2
+ ~p21   2 log


1 

~p1
log


1 
2
+ ~p22   2 log


1 

~p2
:

Proof of Lemma 1.
For CARA preferences u(kj) =  e k=, the marginal rate of substitution (6) can
be written as
MRS   dmg
dmb
jU(Xj;) =

1  
e(P+L q)
eP
(17)
The type frontier T (;; X) is the set of types (; ) for which (4) holds with equality,
which for CARA preferences reads as:

1  
 e(P+L q) + eL
 1 + eP = 1 (18)
Note that smaller  are associated with larger ; and  ! 0 is associated with  !1:
Since we evaluate (17) only along (18), we can substitute the latter into the former to
obtain a marginal willingness to pay along the type frontier of
MRSj(;)2T (;;X) =
 1 + eP
 e(P+L q) + eL
e(P+L q)
eP
=
1  e P
 1 + e(q P ) :
Since P < q; it is immediate that lim!1 MRSj(;)2T (;;X) = 1=1 = 0; which es-
tablishes that MRS goes to zero as  goes to zero. Moreover, MRS is monotonically
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decreasing in  along the type frontier (and thus monotonically increasing in ) if
d MRSj(;)2T (;;X)
d
=
Pe P
  1 + e(q P )  (q   P )e(q P )  1  e P   1 + e(q P )2
is strictly negative. This arises if the denominator is strictly negative, i.e., if
Pe P

 1 + e(q P )

  (q   P )e(q P )  1  e P  < 0
,  q(1  e P ) + P (1  e q) < 0
, P  1  e P  1   q(1  e q) 1 < 0:
which holds since P < q and x=(1  e x) is increasing in x:
Proof of Lemma 2.
This proof follows the outline in the main text. We consider the type frontiers for
two menus Mh = f;; Xhg and Ml = f;; Xlg with qh > ql. We rst establish that if
the two type frontiers intersect, they only intersect once and the high-coverage type
frontier T (;; Xh) is a clockwise rotation of the low-coverage type frontier T (;; Xl).
Denote the type at which the two frontiers intersect by (; ). Consider the case where
qh = ql + " for some small ". By Assumption 1, any type with higher risk  (lower
preference ) on T (;; Xl) than the type at the intersection, who is indi¤erent between
the high-coverage and low-coverage plan, has higher marginal willingness to pay for the
additional coverage. Therefore, they strictly prefer Xh to both Xl and ;, which they
are indi¤erent about. Hence, the type frontier T (;; Xh) lies to the left of T (;; Xl)
for  >  and  < . Any type with lower risk  (higher preference ) has lower
willingness to pay for the additional coverage and thus strictly prefers Xl and ; to Xh.
Hence, the type frontier T (;; Xh) lies to the right of T (;; Xl) for  <  and  > .
This proves that T (;; Xh) intersects T (;; Xl) once and clockwise, if the two intersect.
Now for a larger di¤erence in coverage, we can nd a sequence of contracts Xk with
coverage qk and price Pk, starting from Xl and converging to Xh, such that type (; )
is indi¤erent among any two contracts. The reasoning above now applies for any two
consecutive contracts. Our sequence thus corresponds to a sequence of type frontiers
that intersect only once and imply clockwise rotations around (; ). Hence, this is
also true for T (;; Xh) relative to T (;; Xl).
We now establish when the two type frontiers intersect. Consider rst the case
Ph=qh > Pl=ql (i.e., the average price per unit is higher for the high-coverage contract
Xh). This implies that the risk-neutral type with  = Pl=ql strictly prefers Xl and ;
(which he is indi¤erent about) to buying Xh. Hence, the type frontier T (;; Xh) lies to
the right of the type frontier T (;; Xl) for  = 0. This implies that the two frontiers
cannot intersect, since T (;; Xh) would be a clockwise rotation of T (;; Xl) and thus to
the left of it for  = 0 in case the type frontiers were to intersect.
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Consider now the case that Ph=qh  Pl=ql. In this case, the risk neutral type with
 = Pl=ql prefers Xh above Xl and ;. Moreover, since the marginal willingness to
pay for the additional coverage converges to zero when moving up along the frontier
T (;; Xl), there is a type with su¢ cient low risk (and high preference) that prefers Xl
(and thus ;) above Xh as long as Ph > Pl. Hence, the two type frontiers intersect.
However, if Ph  Pl, all types on T (;; Xl) strictly prefer Xh above Xl and thus ;. The
two type frontiers again do not intersect. This proves the rst part of the Proposition.
Since T (;; Xh) is a clockwise rotation of T (;; Xl) around (; ), the high-coverage
contract Xh di¤erentially attracts types with high risk, but low preference. Types that
prefer Xh above ;, but ; above Xl (i.e., B (Xhj f;; Xhg) nB (Xlj f;; Xlg)), need to have
preference    and risk   . Only individuals with such types could rationalize
that plan Xh attracts a larger share of the population than plan Xl. Similarly, types
that prefer Xl above ;, but ; above Xh (i.e., B (Xlj f;; Xlg) nB (Xhj f;; Xhg)), need to
have preference    and risk   . Only these types could rationalize that plan Xl
attracts a larger share of the population than plan Xh. Hence, we haveZ

Z

dH 
Z
B(Xhjf;;Xhg)nB(Xljf;;Xlg)
dH

Z
B(Xhjf;;Xhg)nB(Xljf;;Xlg)
dH  
Z
B(Xljf;;Xlg)nB(XH jf;;XHg)
dH
= h   l
  
Z
B(Xljf;;Xlg)nB(XH jf;;XHg)
dH
  
Z

Z

dH,
which proves the second part of the proposition. Note that if the type frontiers do not
intersect, the support of the set of types that prefer the one plan, but not the other,
covers the entire range of the preference domain. The di¤erential plan share no longer
places a bound on the distribution of preferences.
Proof of Lemma 3.
By Lemma 2, we know that type frontiers T (;; Xh) and T (;; Xl) intersect if and
only if Ph=qh  Pl=ql and Ph > Pl. We denote this intersection by (; ). In this
case, the type frontier T (Xh; Xl) intersects both frontiers again at (; ), since this
intersection type is indi¤erent among both plans and the option not to buy insurance.
Moreover, the type frontier T (Xh; Xl) is a clockwise rotation of T (;; Xh), which is
a clockwise rotation of T (;; Xl). Note rst that the willingness to choose the high-
coverage plan over the low-coverage plan is increasing in both risk and preference.
The type frontier is monotonically decreasing in (; )-space, just like the original two
frontiers. Now consider a type on the frontier T (;; Xh) above the intersection (with
low risk, but high preference). This type strictly prefers Xl to ; and thus Xh, since
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T (;; Xh) is to the right of T (;; Xl). Hence, the type frontier T (Xh; Xl) is to the right
of T (;; Xh). The set of types choosing Xl above both Xh and ;, i.e., B (Xljf;; Xl; Xhg)
corresponds to this region between the two frontiers T (;; Xl) and T (Xh; Xl) above
(; ). Indeed, consider a type on the frontier T (;; Xh) below the intersection (with
high risk, but low preference). This type strictly prefers ; and thus Xh to Xl. Hence,
the type frontier T (Xh; Xl) is to the left of T (;; Xh) (and thus to the left of T (;; Xl)).
This implies that no type with  <  or  >  will choose the low-coverage plan. It
immediately follows that the share of individuals buying the low-coverage plan (out of
this 3-options menu) puts the following lower bound,Z

Z

dH 
Z
B(Xljf;;Xl;Xhg)
dH  D (XljC) .
For completeness, the set of types choosing Xh above Xl and ;, i.e., B (Xhjf;; Xl; Xhg)
corresponds to the region to the right of T (;; Xh) below (; ) and to the right of
T (Xh; Xl) above (; ), as illustrated in Figure 5.
Note that if Ph  Pl, no type will ever buy the low-coverage plan. Hence, the
only relevant type frontier is T (;; Xh). If Ph > Pl and Ph=qh > Pl=ql, none of the
type frontiers intersect. The type frontier T (Xh; Xl) now lies to the right of the type
frontier T (;; Xh), which lies to the right of type frontier T (;; Xl). Types to the right
of T (Xh; Xl) will buy the high-coverage plan. Types to the left of T (;; Xl) will buy
no insurance. Types in between will buy the low-coverage plan. Since the support of
any of the choices corresponds to the full preference domain, we can place no bounds
on the distribution of preferences.
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A.2 Empirical Appendix
In this Appendix, we present the optimal plan choice results under di¤erent assump-
tions. In Figure A.1, we model alternative relationships between the mean and vari-
ance of claims. In our main analyses, for risk type , the expected claims distribu-
tion is assumed to follow a log normal distribution with mean =  and variance =

4053

1
2  10451
2
For comparison purposes, we show, once again, the optimal choice for each , 
pair for older individuals in Panel C of Figure A.1. We then model choice with more
or less variability in claims. In Panel A of Figure A.1, we show the choice assum-
ing that the variance of claims is half of that in our main specications: variance=
1
2

4053

1
2  10451
2
. This would correspond to a case in which individuals have addi-
tional information predicting about their expected costs, reducing variability. Then,
in Panel B, we run a high variance specication where variance is twice that in our
main specications: variance = 2 4053

1
2  10451
2
. The results are intuitive: more
variability increases the demand for more generous insurance.
We then turn to alternative menu designs in Figure A.2, again showing optimal
choices for older individuals. Panel A examines a modied menu, in which the Bronze
Medium plan has a deductible of $1462 instead of $2000; we make this modication so
that the actuarial value of the Bronze Medium plan as modeled matches the actuarial
value of the more complex Bronze Medium plan on the exchange. This menu leads to
some modest changes in choice as compared to our main specication. In Panel B, we
consider the case in which the Bronze Medium plan has zero coinsurance as produced by
our original method described in the text. Unsurprisingly, this leads to Bronze Medium
being a very favored plan. However, this is unlikely to be a faithful representation of
the Bronze Medium characteristics. Finally, Panel C of Figure A.2 examines a very
di¤erent menu design. For Panel C, we construct coinsurance values (for plans that
have copayments instead of coinsurance) by taking the hospital copayment value and
dividing by the mean cost of a hospital admission of $9700. This method, however, does
not do a good job modeling the relative quality of Silver Low, as Silver Low requires
paying the deductible and then has zero hospital copayment. We then drop Silver Low
from this menu. The menu of coinsurance values used in Panel C is given below:
Coinsurance for Panel C of Figure A.2
Bronze Low 0.2
Bronze Medium 0.05
Bronze High 0.35
Silver High 0.05
Gold 0.02
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Figure A.1: Optimal plan choices for older individuals under alternative variance as-
sumptions.
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Figure A.2: Optimal plan choices for older individuals under alternative menu designs.
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Table A.1: Summary of detailed plan parameters, taken from the HIXs website
Plan Design Deductible Max OOP Doctor Visit Generic Rx Emergency Room Hospital Stay
Bronze Low $2000 $5000 deduct., then $25 copay deduct., then $15 copay deduct., then $100 copay deduct., then 20% co-insurance
Bronze Medium $2000 $5000 $30 copay $10 copay deduct., then $150 copay deduct., then $500 copay
Bronze High $250 $5000 $25 copay $15 copay $150 copay deduct., then 35% co-insurance
Silver Low $1000 $2000 $20 copay $15 copay deduct., then $100 copay deduct., then no copay
Silver High $0 $2000 $25 copay $15 copay $100 copay $500 copay
Gold $0 None $20 copay $15 copay $75 copay $150 copay
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Table A.2: Detailed Plan Shares, among individuals who chose Neighborhood
Health Plan.
Age Group
27-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55+
Bronze Low 13.3% 20.0% 20.0% 18.0% 20.5% 21.6% 18.2%
Bronze Medium 7.1% 7.3% 6.0% 8.0% 10.3% 18.2% 15.5%
Bronze High 49.0% 38.2% 35.0% 38.0% 37.2% 15.9% 33.6%
Silver Low 1.0% 4.5% 5.0% 2.0% 1.3% 3.4% 3.6%
Silver High 19.4% 19.1% 19.0% 22.0% 21.8% 28.4% 25.5%
Gold 10.2% 10.9% 15.0% 12.0% 9.0% 12.5% 3.6%
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